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Abstract
Currently, to satisfy the high number of system requirements, complex software is created
which makes its development cost-intensive and more susceptible to security vulnerabilities.
In software security testing, empirical studies typically use artificial faulty programs because
of the challenges involved in the extraction or reproduction of real security vulnerabilities. Thus,
researchers tend to use hand-seeded faults or mutations to overcome these issues which might
not be suitable for software testing techniques since the two approaches can create samples that
inadvertently differ from the real vulnerabilities. Secbench is a database of security vulnerabilities
mined from Github which hosts millions of open-source projects carrying a considerable number
of security vulnerabilities.
The majority of software development costs is on identifying and correcting defects. In order
to minimize such costs, software engineers answered creating static analysis tools that allow the
detection of defects in the source code before being sent to production or even executed. Despite
the promising future of these tools on reducing costs during the software development phase,
there are studies that show that the tools’ vulnerabilities detection capability is comparable or
even worse than random guessing, i.e., these tools are still far from their higher level of maturity,
since the percentage of undetected security vulnerabilities is high and the number of correctly
detected defects is lower than the false ones.
This study evaluates the performance and coverage of some static analysis tools when scanning
for real security vulnerabilities mined from Github. Each vulnerability represents a test case con-
taining the vulnerable code (Vvul) which can or can not be exposed; and, the non-vulnerable code
(Vfix) - fix or patch - which is not exposed. These test cases were executed by the static analysis
tools and yielded a better analysis in terms of performance and security vulnerabilities coverage.
This methodology allowed the identification of improvements in the static analysis tools that were
studied.
Besides contributing to the improvement of these tools, it also contributes to a more confident
tools choice by security consultants, programmers and companies.
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Resumo
Atualmente, de forma a satisfazer o elevado número de requisitos de um sistema, é produzido
software complexo que torna o seu desenvolvimento custoso e mais susceptível a vulnerabilidades
de segurança.
Na área de testes aplicados à segurança, estudo empíricos usam tipicamente programas com
falhas artificiais devido aos desafios envolvidos na extração e reprodução de vulnerabilidades de
segurança reais. Portanto, os investigadores tendem a usar falhas artificialmente plantadas ou mu-
tações para ultrapassar esses problemas que podem não ser o mais adequado às técnicas na área
de testes de software dado que as duas abordagens podem criar amostras que inadvertidamente
diferem de vulnerabilidades reais. Secbench é uma base de dados de vulnerabilidades de segu-
rança extraídas do Github que inclui milhões de projetos open-source que possuem um número
considerável de vulnerabilidades de segurança.
A maioria dos custos no desenvolvimento de software é na identificação e correção de defeitos.
De forma a minimizar esses custos, os engenheiros de software responderam com a criação de
ferramentas de análise estática que permitem a deteção de defeitos no código fonte antes de ser
enviado para produção or até executado. Apesar do futuro promissor destas ferramentas na redução
de custos durante a fase de desenvolvimento de software, há estudos que mostram que a sua
capacidade na deteção de vulnerabilidades é comparável ou até pior que deteção aleatória, i.e.,
estas ferramentas estão ainda longe do seu maior nível de maturidade, visto que a percentagem
de vulnerabilidades de segurança não detetadas é maior e o número de vulnerabilidades detetadas
corretamente é menor que as detetadas falsamente.
Este estudo avalia a performance e cobertura de algumas ferramentas de análise estática quando
procurando por vulnerabilidades de segurança reais extraídas do Github. Cada vulnerabilidade rep-
resenta um caso de teste que contém o código vulnerável (Vvul) que pode ou não ser exposto; e, o
código não vulnerável (Vfix) - correção ou patch - que não é exposto. Estes casos de teste foram
executados pelas ferramentas de análise estática e levaram a uma melhor análise em termos de
perfomance e cobertura de ferramentas de análise estática. Esta metodologia permitiu identificar
melhoramentos nas ferramentas de análise estática que foram estudadas.
Além de contribuir para o melhoramento destas ferramentas, também contribui para uma maior
confiança na escolha das mesmas por consultores na área de segurança, programadores and com-
panies.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
From holding hostage worldwide companies information to keeping several distributed sys-
tems down for hours, the last two years were marked by several security attacks which are the
result of complex software and its fast production.
Under the rush of companies trying to outdo each other, fast updates and software supporting
new features with every new release, testing tends do be one of the most forgotten phases of the
software development lyfe cycle (SDLC). Not only due the lack of reliable automated tools to test
software but also due to the high costs associated with the task. Some companies do not even pay
attention to the process of finding security vulnerabilities before shipping software. The ones that
do care, normally have two choices:
• They try to tackle the issue hiring testers and the best developers they can; making extensive
manual code reviews or even paying money to external people to find bugs (bug bounty
programs);
• Or, they ship the product based on a possible "well-thought-out" balance between the dam-
ages of a vulnerable version and the fact that the vulnerable code would never be disclosed.
Companies tend to choose the second one since the first one is too time-consuming and mon-
etarily unbearable. Although dangerous, companies would escape attacks with the second ap-
proach, but now, and more than ever, it rarely happens and the proof is the increasing of security
vulnerabilities reported by annual security reports [USA17, CIS07, fNS17].
Figure 1.1: Software development life cycle (SDLC)
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Testing (Fig. 1.1) is one of the most important activities in SDLC since it is responsible for
ensuring software’s quality through the detection of the conditions which may lead to software
failures.
Static Analysis Tools (SATs) are one of the most promissing ways of fighting the costs associ-
ated with the identification and correction of software vulnerabilities. But despite their potential,
the results are still far from being reliable and sometimes even understandable [JSMHB13].
This thesis’ main goal is to understand and discuss if the currently used methodology (Chap.
3) allows researchers to study and find points of modernization on SATs using real security vul-
nerabilities. On the other hand, there are no databases containing a considerable amount of real
security vulnerabilities to study these tools. So, other goal will be the analysis of source code
hosting websites to see if there is available information to create a benchmark of real security
vulnerabilities.
This chapter aims the topics contextualization and motivation, a better explanation of the prob-
lems and goals behind this thesis and also a brief introduction to the used terminology.
1.1 Context
More than one century ago, Nevil Maskelyne disrupted John Fleming’s public demonstration
of a supposedly secure wireless telegraphy technology created by Guglielmo Marconi, sending
insulting messages in morse code through the auditorium’s projector [Dav15]. This was the first
known security attack ever performed, back in the early 1900s.
Since then, technology had an explosive growth in several different fields which not only
improved people’s lives, but turned to be a problem and threat for technology companies in terms
of holding the consequent and adjacent increase of security vulnerabilities. According to IBM’s
X-Force Threat Intelligence 2017 Report [USA17], the number of vulnerabilities per year has been
significantly increasing over the past 6 years. Not only the number of known vulnerabilities (e.g.,
SQL injection, cross-site scripting and others) but also the number of the unknown ones, which
grants even more importance to this field since developers have been struggling already with the
disclosed ones.
To satisfy the high amount of system requirements, developers produce software with millions
of lines of code which turns its development cost-intensive and more susceptible to vulnerabilities
that can result in serious security risks. The identification and correction of defects takes more
than 50% of the software development costs [Tas02] which is extremely high given all the phases
involved in the SDLC (Fig. 1.1). This is due to the lack of reliable automated techniques and tools
to detect these issues and the non-knowledge of their existence by developers [YM13].
Several SATs (Tab. 2.7) are able to detect security vulnerabilities through a source code scan
which may help reducing the time spent on the vulnerabilities identification and correction. Un-
fortunately, their detection capability is comparable or even worse than random guessing [GPP15],
i.e., the percentage of undetected security vulnerabilities of these tools is high and the number of
correctly detected defects is lower than the false ones.
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In order to study and improve these software testing techniques, empirical studies using real
security vulnerabilities are crucial [Bri07] to gain a better understanding of what tools are able to
detect [BL04].
Yet, performing empirical studies in the software testing research field is challenging due to
the lack of widely accepted and easy-to-use databases of real bugs [JJE14, DER05], as well as the
fact that it requires human effort and CPU time [Bri07]. Consequently, researchers tend to use
databases of hand-seeded vulnerabilities which differ inadvertently from real vulnerabilities and
thus might not work with the testing techniques under evaluation [JJI+14, PCJ+17]. According
with [JJI+14], it is only possible to represent real security vulnerabilities using mutations under
specific conditions, i.e., mutations may not be always a feasible approach to represent real security
vulnerabilities. Thus, it is important to contribute with new databases of security vulnerabilities to
help increasing the number of available test cases to study static analysis tools.
Figure 1.2: Overview of the different layers of issues and their dependencies that need to be solved
in order to produce safer and cheaper software
The improvement of the SATs can definitely be a major step not only on the decreasing of
time and money spent on vulnerabilities identification and correction; but also on the number
of security vulnerabilities on the released software versions. It is necessary to obtain primitive
data (e.g., database of real security vulnerabilities) which is difficult to collect since there are not
feasible tools or methodologies to collect them easily; and, because until a few years ago there was
no information available (e.g., software source code). Due to the now increasing adhesion to the
production of open-source software (OSS), we believe source code hosting websites (e.g., Github,
Bitbucket and SVN) contain information to collect test cases to study the SATs.
Thus, research issues must be tackled, in order to smooth companies’ wastes, always with the
main goal of helping developers producing safer and cheaper software (Fig. 1.2).
1.2 Motivation
It is important to find means to help researchers minimizing the impact of the lack of reliable
SATs since they have strong potential on decreasing the costs associated with testing. While some
vulnerabilities can be not even disclosed, others can lead to the users privacy violation.
The past years have been flooded by news of security attacks from the cybersecurity world:
3
Introduction
• Exposure of large amounts of sensitive data (e.g., 17M of zomato accounts stolen in 2015
which were put up for sale on the dark web marketplace only now in 2017) [Dun17].
• Phishing attacks (e.g., a simple link faking to be a shared Google Docs document would
provide access to user e-mails and contacts) [Kha17b].
• Denial-of-service attacks like the one experienced last year by Twitter, The Guardian, Net-
flix, CNN and many other companies around the world. A network of computers infected
with a special malware (botnet) was programmed to inject traffic into a server until it col-
lapsed under the strain [Woo16].
• Gotofail vulnerability on iOS 7 (Apple, 2014). This vulnerability kept the system vulnerable
for a few months due to an extra gotofail after the end of an if which would make the program
jump to the end without verifying the authentication signature [Gua14].
• The shellshock vulnerability was discovered in 2014 on most versions of Linux and Unix
operating systems. An attacker would exploit the issue remotely forcing an application to
send a malicious environment variable to Bash [ABE+15].
• Or, the one that possibly stamped the year, the ransomware attack which is still very fresh
and kept hostage many companies, industries and hospitals informations [Kha17a].
All of these attacks were able to succeed due to the presence of security vulnerabilities that
were not tackled before someone exploit them.
Early in the current year, the European Union Agency for Network and Information Security
(ENISA) released their annual Cyber-Threats and Trends report of 2016 [fNS17] where the agency
reports that the last year was marked by cyber attacks whose main goals were mainly monetization
and politic impact. Trends are basically the same as in 2015, being the top of the table malwares,
web based attacks, web applications attacks, denial-of-service and botnets.
A survey performed on 400 IT executives from 19 industries revealed that 48% of the firms
experienced at least one Internet-of-Things (IoT) security breach with a potential cost of $20
millions in a company whose annual revenue is above $2 billion [Sec17].
For these reasons, it is necessary to search and improve automated techniques and tools to
help companies reducing not only the costs of identifying and correcting defects but also the costs
associated with the breaches that can result from the production of unsafe software.
Improving these tools will be a major step in the adoption of automated techniques for the
identification and correction of security vulnerabilities phase.
1.3 Scientific Concepts and Definitions
To better understand the terminology used throughout this thesis, the definitions of a few terms
are presented in this section.
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• A vulnerability is a software defect which can be exploit by an attacker whose goal is to
violate the software security policy.
• When the word real is used to qualify vulnerabilities, it is to emphasize the idea that they
were naturally created by developers, i.e., they were not created with the purpose of testing
software (non artificial test cases).
Definition 1 A test case t is a 3-tuple (v,f,d), where v is the sample of code which contains the
vulnerability (works different from what was expected); f is the sample of code that fixes the
vulnerability (works as expected); and, d is the sample of code which represents the difference
between v and f.
Definition 2 A test suite T = {t1, ..., tn} is a set of test cases whose function is to test if the program
follows the specification (list of requirements).
Definition 3 The cardinality of X (#X) is the number of elements of type X.
The results classification and metrics used to evaluate the tools realibility are based on the
National Security Agency SATs study [fAS11]. Three different types of results classifications will
be considered:
• A True Positive (TP) when the tool correctly identifies and reports the alleged vulnerability.
• A False Positive (FP) when the tool reports the target vulnerability in other part of the test
case - false warning.
• A False Negative (FN) when the tool does not report the supposed vulnerability.
Three different metrics will be used to calculate if the tool is good or bad: precision, recall and
f-score, where #T P is the number of true positives, #FP is the number of false positives and #FN
is the number of false negatives found studying the tool.
• Precision (pr) measures how reliable is the report of the SAT based on the ratio between
the number of reported vulnerabilities by the tools and the number of vulnerabilities on the
code under analysis. If pr = 0, then the SAT is not reliable, but if pr = 1, then the SAT is
100% reliable.
pr =
#T P
#T P+#FP
• Recall (r) or sensibility measures if the tool correctly identifies the vulnerabilities based on
the fraction of real vulnerabilities reported (true positives) from the code under analysis. If
r = 0, then the SAT does not identify correctly the vulnerabilities, but if r = 1, then the SAT
identified all the vulnerabilities correctly.
r =
#T P
#T P+#FN
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• F-score (fs) will help on identifying if a SAT is good or not capturing how many vulner-
abilities were found (true positives) and how much noise is produced (false positives). It
measures the overall tool performance.
f s = 2× pr× r
pr+ r
1.4 Methodology Overview
This thesis proposes a methodology that allows the study of SATs using real security vulnera-
bilities in four different steps (Fig. 1.3).
The methodology starts with the creation of a mining tool whose input is a Github repository
and a previously defined security pattern. This tool iterates all repository commits, in order to
find patterns on its messages. From this process will possibly result candidates to test cases,
i.e., real security vulnerabilities. The source code of the candidates is evaluated by humans to
make sure it is actually a vulnerability and to identify it correctly, since the code may not reflect
the message commit. Then, the candidates were identified as real security vulnerabilities or not.
If yes, the vulnerability may be considered on the SATs study. Each SAT has its own list of
supported vulnerabilities and languages. So, a previous study was elaborate in order to understand
which languages and vulnerabilities each SAT supports (Tab. 2.7). If the vulnerability suits the
tool, its source code will be scanned and the results will go through another manual evaluation
where humans try to understand if the tool results are expected or not. After this last evaluation,
humans are able to determine if the tool is reliable or not. Thus, the researcher may find points
of improvements on the SAT comparing the SAT results and the results from the second manual
evaluation.
Figure 1.3: Methodology overview
It is a very meticulous methodology which will be implemented, tested and discussed through-
out the next chapters.
1.5 Research Questions
As mentioned before, researchers believe SATs are still not reliable due, mainly, to the high
rate of false positives and false negatives; and, to the not user-friendly way of how some warn-
ings are presented [JSMHB13]. Researchers believe that to study these tools, empirical studies
using real security vulnerabilities must be performed since they are crucial [Bri07] to gain a better
understanding of what tools are able to detect [BL04].
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The hypothesis under this thesis is the one presented below:
It is possible to identify points of improvement on a static analysis tool using real security
vulnerabilities.
Based on this, two different groups of research questions will be answered. Firstly, related to
the availability of information on OSS repositories:
• RQ1.1 Is there enough information available on OSS repositories to create a benchmark of
software security vulnerabilities?
• RQ1.2 What are the most prevalent security patterns on OSS repositories?
Secondly, related to the performance and possible improvements resulting from the study per-
formed on the SATs using real security vulnerabilities collected from OSS repositories:
• RQ2.1 Is it viable to study SATs with real security vulnerabilities?
• RQ2.2 Can we understand where SATs can be improved using this methodology?
This thesis tries to answer the previous research questions for two different fields of research
with the aim of satisfying the proposed goals (Sec. 1.6).
1.6 Goals
This thesis has no background tools for mining repositories in this domain or available databases
to be used. So, everything needed to perform the study was created from scratch. This thesis’ goals
are:
• Demonstrate if the chosen methodology works to collect real security vulnerabilities
– Identify a good and considerable amount of trending security patterns
– Create a tool which mines the patterns on Github repositories
– Create a database with real security vulnerabilities
– Contribute with a new test suite of real security vulnerabilities to the software testing
field
• Contribute with a new methodology to study SATs and collect real security vulnerabilities
from OSS software hosted by Github
• Understand if this methodology helps finding points of improvement in the SATs
• Answer the research questions
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The thesis’ main goal is to understand if the methodology provides results that support the
hypothesis. Thus, this methodology can be used to study other tools or as a base in the search for
better approaches on studying SATs; and, even on collecting real vulnerabilities from source code
hosting sites.
1.7 Thesis Structure
This thesis contains another 6 chapters. In chapter 2, the related work and state-of-the-art are
discussed and presented: conclusions obtained from security reports; different techniques avail-
able for defects prediction; and, the state-of-the-art of databases and static analysis tools. In chap-
ter 3, the methodology under the study is presented in detail. In chapter 4, the tooling support cre-
ated to perform the study is presented in detail: different applications created, technologies used,
database structure and data validation. In chapter 5, the statistic results from the database and the
tools studied are discussed and presented. In chapter 6, a few interesting results are highlighted
in order to perform future improvements to the tools studied. In chapter 7, some conclusions,
challenges and limitations are presented along with a few points of discussion for future work.
Appendix A contains the visualization of each security pattern is presented. In Appendix B is pre-
sented the first version of the paper submitted and accepted on the 28th International Workshop
on Principles of Diagnosis (DX’17) 2017 for a poster session.
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Literature Review
In this chapter, an overview of all the subjects involved in this study is provided: security
reports (Sec. 2.1), Github’s interesting information and statistics (Sec. 2.2), defects prediction
techniques that can be used in this study (Sec. 2.3), defects databases (Sec. 2.4) and static analysis
(Sec. 2.5).
2.1 Security Reports
In this section, interesting conclusions and summaries from several security reports are pre-
sented in order to help understand the trendiest security events and what are the types of vulnera-
bilities behind them.
Overall, they all report a significant increasing of security vulnerabilities over the last years
and more or less in the same patterns depending on the focus field. Although, the awareness for
security is starting to emerge between developers and having positive results, the attackers are also
more clever using attacks with higher impacts and attacking larger sets of companies at each time.
2.1.1 IBM X-Force Threat Intelligence 2017
IBM’s X-Force Threat Intelligence 2017 [USA17] is based on information collected on 2016,
from 8K client devices and industries sensors. They classify security events according to their
impact and information available based on the next hierarchy: security event > attack > security
incident > breach, being a breach a security event, attack and incident (Tab. 2.1).
According to these results, IBM’s questions if the decrease of attacks and security incidents
reflects a safer environment and software. It does not, 2016 was one of the most notable years
on cybersecurity with malwares leaving the all Ukraine without electricity, major phising attacks
and information leaks being the largest ones at Germany (1.9 TB of information about european
football players) and Kenya (1TB of Kenyan Ministry of Foreign Affairs including trade secrets
and classified information).
9
Literature Review
Classification Types of Events From 2015 to 2016
1 Security Events ↑ 3%
2 Attacks ↓ 12%
3 Security Incidents ↓ 48%
4 Breach ↑↑
↑↑ - 4 billion records leaked (≡ combined total from the 2 previous years)
Table 2.1: IBM’s executive overview about the different types of security events
Another interesting point reported by IBM is the large number of undisclosed vulnerabilities,
i.e., vulnerabilities that do not belong to any known attack type or class which can be harmful
since developers have been struggling already with the disclosed ones.
Figure 2.1: Security incidents by attack type by time and impact from 2014 to 2017 [USA17]
Spam with malicious content was always a problem, but since March 2016 the issue suffered a
major growth. Based on IBM’s database which contains more than 10K vulnerabilities, cross-site
scripting and SQL injection are the trendiest vulnerabilities and the injection of unexpected items
(42%) and data structures manipulations (32%) the most performed attacks to their clients.
Information and communications is the industry that sharply suffered more breachs in 2016.
To perform malicious spam, clickjacking and phishing attacks, attackers need to obtain peoples’
information. Healthcare is one of the best sources of that kind of sensitive data (e.g., e-mails,
phone numbers, name, addresses and more) and has the higher percentage of attackers in 2016.
2.1.2 Open Web Application Security Project Top 10 2017
In this section, it is given an overview of the changes between 2013 and 2017 (Fig. 2.2) in
the top 10 of the trendiest security vulnerabilities in web applications created by the Open Web
Application Security Project (OWASP).
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The fast adoption of new technologies (e.g., cloud), the automation of software development
processes (e.g., Agile and DevOps), the explosion of third-party libraries and frameworks, and the
advances made by attackers are responsible for the changes on the top 10 OWASP [Fou17].
Insecure direct object reference (A4) and missing function level access control (A7) were
merged into the older category broken access control (A4) since the authors felt it is no longer
needed to separate the two. This separation had the purpose of giving more attention to the differ-
ent patterns.
Figure 2.2: Everything that changed on the OWASP Top 10 from 2013 to 2017 [Fou17]
Due to the lack of capabilities to detect, prevent and respond to manual and automated attacks
a new pattern was created Insufficient Attack Protection (A7). Unvalidated redirects and forwards
(A10) was dropped due to the lack of data showing that is still prevalent issue on the current
software produced.
Current applications and APIs involved in client applications like mobile applications and
JavaScript in the browser are connected to APIs (e.g., SOAP/XML, REST/JSON and many others)
which are often unprotected and contain several security vulnerabilities. Underprotected APIs
(A10) pattern was added in order to give awareness to the importance of maintaining their software
secure since it is used by many applications.
2.1.3 ENISA Threat Landscape Report 2016
According to [fNS17], the maturity of defenders is increasing and security is finally gaining
attention in the professional education and training market. However, attackers are still one step
ahead. They are focused:
• On larger attacks, i.e., attacks that can reach further using distributed denial-of-service at-
tacks through the infection of IoT devices.
• Extortion attacks, targeting comercial organisations and achieving high levels of ransom and
rates of victims.
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• Attacks affecting the outcome of democratic processes (e.g., US elections).
The top 5 of threats in 2016 contains malware, web based attacks, web application attacks,
denial-of-service and botnets which reflects this thesis’ motivation.
2.2 Github
Github is one of the most used source code hosting websites by developers. It is known as the
social network for programmers and developers. Many other source code hosting websites already
existed, but Github was the only one able to conquer companies like Google, Microsoft and many
others. It contains more than 22M of users and 61M of OSS repositories and it shares more than
199M issues. So, Github is definitely a huge domain where we can possibly find information.
According to a few statistics collected from the Github blog1 and GitHut2, some of the most
popular programming languages on Github are JavaScript, Java, Python, Ruby, PHP, CSS, C, C++,
C# and Objective-C.
Language #Repositories #Closed Issues #Open Issues
JavaScript 978,726 3,386,650 679,953
Java 739,714 3,168,495 851,421
Python 509,852 2,079,340 399,232
Ruby 497,604 1,877,208 356,441
PHP 457,446 2,017,814 358,568
CSS 351,693 619,493 103,597
C 260,948 1,206,189 450,685
C++ 263,881 1,311,363 258,093
C# 241,828 1,010,944 312,306
Objective-C 165,701 394,912 116,723
Table 2.2: 10 of the most popular programming languages on Github statistics
Above (Tab. 2.2) are presented a few statistics collected from Github: number of repositories,
number of closed issues and open issues. Issues can be also a good source of information for
collecting test cases.
Along with the variety of languages, Github has repositories spanning different sizes produced
by millions of different programmers, with good and bad programming skills, which is reflected
on the quality of the source code. This can be a threat on finding test cases of good quality, since
there are not automated ways of checking if a repository is good or not.
There is no much information on finding security vulnerabilities on Github: if there is any
correlation with the repository size, the development time (project maturity) or even the number
of pull requests.
1https://github.com/blog/2047-language-trends-on-github
2http://githut.info/
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Figure 2.3: An example of the information provided by Github for a sucessfully caught test case:
commit 8414fe1 from linux developed by torvalds
Github hosts millions of repositories containing hundreds even thousands of commits. Each
commit has a message associated reflecting the purpose of the commit (Fig. 2.3). Since the
message is written by humans, sometimes they may not reflect entirely what is in the source code
or vice-versa.
Everytime a developer has something new to add to the project, a new commit is made. Thus,
Github provides a tree of commits where you can see the difference between the previous commit
and the current commit. If a fix of a security vulnerability is caught on the current commit, then
the probability of the vulnerability being on the previous commit is high.
2.3 Defects Prediction
In order to identify bug fixes on software histories, [SZZ05] proposes syntatic analysis and
semantic analysis. Assuming a link (t, b) between a transaction t and a bug b, there are two
different levels of confidence associated: syntatics and semantics.
On syntatic analysis, they split all the log file into tokens in order to find links to the bug
database. Regular expressions like bug[# \t]*[0-9]+ are used to represent numbers which
are potential links to bugs. Tokens can be bug numbers, plain numbers, keywords matched with
bugs?|defects?|patch and words.
They assume a bug has a initial confidence of 0 and it can be increased until 2. To increase the
level of confidence, a few conditions need to be fulfilled: the number needs to be a bug number
and the log message needs to contain a keyword or only plain or bug numbers.
In terms of semantic analysis, the confidence level is also used but for other conditions: b
was set to fixed at least once, the bug’s report description is contained on the log message of t,
the author of t has been assigned to the bug b and, one or more the files affected by t have been
attached to b.
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In terms of predicting vulnerable software components, specific patterns must be also detected
other than only looking for general patterns like buffer overflows. This may not work well with
[SZZ05], thus Vulture was created to mine a vulnerability database, the software history and
the code base in order to map past vulnerabilities to entities in software projects that can have
vulnerabilities[NZHZ07]. Thus, a resulting predictor can predict future vulnerabilities on new
components, based on import and function calls.
On [NZHZ07], researchers retrieved all identifiers from advisors which is where vulnerabil-
ities are anounced. Then, they searched for references to the database that would take form of
links containing the bug identifier of the defect that caused the vulnerability. It is assumed that a
component is characterized by its imports and function calls.
2.4 Defects Databases
This section mentions the existing related work in the field of databases created to perform
empirical studies in the software testing research area. On table 2.3 is presented an overview of a
few databases that satisfy the requirements presented below:
The database contains real defects SIR, Defects4j, Safety-db
The database contains security vulnerabilities CAS, OSWAP Benchmark, Safety-db
The database was created to study testing tools CodeChecker
Table 2.3: Defects databases state-of-the-art and requirements fulfilled
Although there are databases targeting security vulnerabilities test cases, only one of them
contains real vulnerabilities (Tab. 2.4), the other ones are a mix of real and artificial test cases, or
they only contain artificial samples.
2.5 Static Analysis
Static analysis is usually performed using automated tools (SATs) as a part of code review
carried out during the SDLC. The SATs were designed to analyze source code and/or binary code
and intermediate code versions (e.g., Java bytecodes or Microsoft Intermediate Language) to help
finding security flaws. The analysis is named static because it does not involve code execution.
2.5.1 Why Static Analysis?
Simple commands like grep, can be used to find vulnerabilities. The function gets, from C
library, is responsible for a high percentage of buffer overflows because it does not have a buffer
size limit, so the code’s safety depends on the user to always manage the quantity of inserted
characters. This function is highly vulnerable, therefore, is one of the most used functions to
recognize the presence of the vulnerability. So, if a developer does grep gets *.c on a file where
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the function is used it may get a vulnerability. This type of commands allow a developer to search
for vulnerabilities without executing the code, which is basically what static analysis does.
Using this type of commands has several limitations, like the ability of distinguish between
real function calls or equal sequences on comments, variables and strings; and, is non-praticable
to developers since they have to run the command for each function and file.
In order to solve those limitations, a few automated tools (RATS3, Flawfinder4 and ITS4
[VBKM00]) were created using almost the same mechanism as a compiler on the errors verifi-
cation but, in this case, for vulnerabilities (source code separated in tokens and matching analy-
sis between them and the dangerous functions). The main component behind these tools was a
database with words or rules for detecting vulnerabilities.
Thus, SATs appeared to automate the coder manual reviews which are one of the most hard-
working and costly tasks done by developers during the SDLC [Tas02].
According to [GPP15], SATs performance and coverage are still far from its higher level of
maturity. But they also have its own advantages and promissing features (Tab. 2.5): they can make
developers lives easier and have a high potential of scalability and improvement. It is a field where
researchers must definitely invest. It is not enough to have good tools, researchers must understand
their problems and discover how to solve them because A fool with a tool is still a fool if it does
not know what trully has in hands.
Advantages Disadvantages
Automatize the verification of vulnerabilities
in the source code (free of human errors).
False negatives. The tools do not identify all
the known vulnerabilities (limited scope).
Allow the detection of vulnerabilities before
the software is sent to production.
It’s not possible to test all the conditions in
useful time (limited analysis).
Focus on the source of the vulnerabilities and
not on their effects.
False Positives. Many defects are hard to
identify as vulnerabilities or not.
If new vulnerabilities appear, new rules can
be added (High Scalability).
It is not easy to run them and understand its
results (Not user-friendly).
Detection of vulnerabilities, bugs, code style
issues and more.
Table 2.5: SATs advantages and disadvantages
2.5.2 How does a SAT work?
The analysis is performed based on the vulnerabilities description which, normally, consists on
a group of rules (Fig. 2.4). The first stage (Model Construction) corresponds to the first functions
of a compiler: scanner, pre-processing and parser. The model is an abstract syntax tree (AST)
which can be used to represent programming languages. Along the AST, a symbol table is created
3https://security.web.cern.ch/security/recommendations/en/codetools/rats.shtml
4https://security.web.cern.ch/security/recommendations/en/codetools/flawfinder.
shtml
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with the function names, variables, etc. Some tools extend the AST to a control flow graph where
each node represents one or more instructions which are executed sequently. The direction from
each connection between nodes represents the potential control flow. After creating the trees and
graphs, the analysis is performed using as input the security rules that need to be verified (Fig.
2.4).
Figure 2.4: Basic operation of a SAT
It is important to note that more advanced techniques exist to perform the analysis in a more
efficient way: symbolic execution [YT88], abstract interpretation [CC77] and more.
2.5.3 Semantic Analysis
These are the most prevalent semantic analyzers within security: data types verification, con-
trol flow analysis and data flow analysis.
String comparison Operates directly on source-code in first stage of compila-
tion (scanner) like the command grep.
Lexical Analyzer Operates over the tokens generated by the scanner, after
the first compilation stage. The tools mentioned on sec.
2.5.1 are an example and unlike string comparators they do
not mislead a variable of name getsugar with the call gets.
Semantic Analyzer Operates over the abstract syntax tree generated by the
parser, after the third compilation stage. Unlike lexical an-
alyzers, they do not mislead a variable and a function call
with the exact same name.
Table 2.6: Different types of SATs analyzers
2.5.3.1 Data Types Verification
In programming, data types limit the way of how data is manipulated (e.g., certain variables
are defined as int and others as string to avoid assignments between them). Thus, the notion of
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type verification is intrinsically connected with the data types notion. Compilers and languages
interpreters that support data types (e.g., C and Java) make this type of verification.
Data types verification based on the original data types of languages like C and Java have
a limited utility on the vulnerabilities static analysis because the compilers perform a data type
verification which is more restrictive than necessary. One example is the integer vulnerability.
Sometimes, the compilers perform an overly restrictive type verification like in Java, where the
verification process allows the assignment of a short to an int but not vice-versa. However, in C
the compiler allows integers assignments which can result in a vulnerability.
Two of the integer vulnerabilities that can be detect using this approach are the sinal errors - a
signed int is assigned to an int variable without sign - and the truncation bugs - an int represented
by a certain number of bits is assigned to a variable with less bits. In both cases, the vulnerability
is a result of wrong assigning between incompatible data types which can be detect in the process
verification simply determining if the incompatibility exists or not.
2.5.3.2 Control Flow Analysis
This type of analysis traverses all possible and different execution paths through the code
instructions (conditional, cycles, jumps and function calls) which will result in a control flow
graph. The control flow analysis consists on traversing the graph and verifying if certain rules are
satisfied. This approach can be used to detect several vulnerabilities and bugs (e.g., memory leaks
or resource leaks).
One of the main limitations of this approach is the lack of access to external libraries (e.g.,
C library). Thus, developers tend to create models to represent their features. For example, to
analyze a function that uses malloc or fopen it’s necessary to create models to represent their
external behavior and impact.
There are three different levels of control flow analysis: local analysis (isolated analysis of
a function or component); module analysis (module, class or file analysis) and interprocedural
analysis (all program is analyzed).The result of local analysis is a function module. Module and
interprocedural analysis recursively analyze each function of the module and program untill all
the modules are created. This can be time-consuming for large projects.
For each chosen path, the process starts with the analysis of the memory state, then the path is
simulated throwing or not alarms when vulnerabilities are identified, and in the end the all path is
analyzed generating alarms if necessary. After all paths being analyzed a model is created to the
function.
2.5.3.3 Data Flow Analysis
Data flow analysis is the process of deriving information about the run time behavior of a
program [KSK09]. This analysis can be done based on a control flow graph using the control
flow analysis. There are several ways of data flow analysis in the security domain, but the most
common is the taint analysis. This type of analysis is one of the most important to discover coding
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vulnerabilities, since it verifies if compromised data - data under the attackers domain - is used by
dangerous functions. One example is the strcpy function which can be vulnerable if the source
string is compromised.
The main ideia is to follow the data flow, in order to understand if input data reaches dangerous
code instructions. This technique classifies if the returning value of a function is potentially com-
promissed (tainted) or if an argument from a library function can not be compromissed (untainted)
based on the parameters.
Other question is the propagation associated with the assign between compromissed variables.
This is obvious, if a is compromissed and a = b then b will be also compromissed. But if d
is compromissed and c = f unc(d), then in this case it is not possible to immediately say if c is
compromissed or not. Thus, it is necessary to annotate the function f unc definition which is a new
model to be used like the ones used in the control flow analysis.
Data flow analysis discovers several types of vulnerabilities (e.g., buffer overflows, cross site
scripting and injection).
2.5.4 Static Analysis Tools
Our research counts with more than 25 SATs (Tab. 2.7 - 2.11). It is possible to find free and
open-source tools for a wide range of languages (e.g., Java, C/C++, Objective-C, Python, etc)
and companies (e.g., Facebook, Google, NASA and more) using different types of analysis (e.g.,
control flow graph analysis, taint analysis, etc).
Due to the lack of documentation on many tools, it is not possible to obtain specific infor-
mation like the patterns they identify (at least without exploring the tool source code in deep).
Less than 50% have support for Continuous Integration (CI) or are able to integrate an integrated
development environment (IDE).
Overall, the tools are able to identify several different patterns. However, there is a consider-
able percentage focusing only on the OWASP top 10.
Other systems of classification used by the tools to report the patterns that they identify are the
common dictionaries of weaknesses (CWE5) and vulnerabilities (CVE6).
In order to be a good candidate to the study, the tool has to be OSS and needs to accept software
from other users. OSS-Fuzz only allows you to submit your projects to review and Codacy only
allows you to scan projects for which you contributed. More information will be presented on how
to identify a good condidate on section 3.2.
5https://cwe.mitre.org/
6https://cve.mitre.org/
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Chapter 3
Methodology
This chapter presents in detail the methodology used to prove the thesis hyphotesis: It is pos-
sible to identify points of improvement on a static analysis tool using real security vulnerabilities.
Starting with the collection of the patterns; then the mining process and the steps associated with
the resulting samples evaluation; the identification process behind the chosen test cases used on
the SAT study; and, finally the evaluation of the SAT results to find points of improvement on the
tool under study.
3.1 Identification and Extraction of Vulnerabilities from Github
This section describes the methodology used to obtain real security vulnerabilities: from the
mining process to the samples evaluation and approval.
The main goal with this approach is the identification and extraction of real security vulnerabil-
ities fixed naturally by developers on their daily basis work. The research for new methodologies
to retrieve primitive data in this field is really important due to the lack of databases with a consid-
erable amount of test cases and lack of variety for different defects and languages to support SATs
studies. Since, there is no database that can support this study, we will have to create ours.
The first step was the identification of a considerable amount of trending security patterns
(sec. 3.1.1). Initially, the main focus was the top 10 OWASP 2017 and other trending security vul-
nerabilities like memory leaks and buffer overflows which are not much prevalent between web
applications. Thereafter, more patterns were added and there is still place for many others. For
each pattern, there is a collection of words and acronyms which characterizes the security vulner-
ability. These words were mined on the commits messages, in order to find possible candidates to
test cases. Every time the tool catches a pattern, it saved the sample on the cloud and the informa-
tions attached (e.g., identifier, type of security vulnerability, etc) on the database. As we can see
on figure 3.1, after saving the data there is an evaluation process (3.1.3) to validate whether the
caught sample represents the fix of a potential security vulnerability or not. When approved, the
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Figure 3.1: Workflow to extract and identify real security vulnerabilities
sample’s information is updated on the database and, consequently, the test case (3.1.2) is added
to the final database.
The resulting test cases were organized based on the security vulnerability patterns and the
source code language.
3.1.1 Security Patterns
The goal was mining for indications of a vulnerability fix or patch commited by a developer
on Github repositories.
Assuming that the trendiest security vulnerabilities will be found more easily on Github we
tried to understand if the current security reports actually reflect in the domain. So, the Github
search engine was used to see if overall it would be possible to collect information for the chosen
patterns. The number of commits for each pattern was checked on the engine which instantly led
to a good perception of what patterns would be more difficult to extract.
Then, for each pattern a regular expression was created joining specific words from its own
domain and words highlighting the fix of a vulnerability. In order to represent the fixing of a vul-
nerability, words like fix, patch, found, prevent and protect were used. In certain cases, like the
pattern iap (Tab. 3.1), it was necessary to adapt the approach due to the nature of the vulnerability.
This pattern represents the lack of automated mechanisms for detecting and protecting applica-
tions. So, instead of the normal set, another words were used: detect, block, answer and respond.
It was necessary to adapt the words to each type of vulnerability. To really specify the patterns and
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distinguish between them more specific words were added. For example, to characterize cross-
site scripting vulnerability tokens like cross-site scripting, xss, script attack and many others were
used. Each regular expression can be visualized on the thesis’ website1.
The final set of security patterns used on this study is presented on table 3.1 and table 3.2.
The first group represents the top 10 OWASP 2017 and the second one is mainly non web security
vulnerabilities, i.e., which you can see more on applications using programming languages like C,
C++ and Java.
ID Pattern
injec Injection
auth Broken Authentication and Session Management
xss Cross-Site Scripting
bac Broken Access Control
smis Security Misconfiguration
sde Sensitive Data Exposure
iap Insufficient Attack Protection
csrf Cross-Site Request Forgery
ucwkv Using Components with Known Vulnerabilities
upapi Underprotected APIs
Table 3.1: Top 10 OWASP 2017
ID Pattern
ml Memory Leaks
over Overflow
rl Resource Leaks
dos Denial-of-Service
pathtrav Path Traversal
misc Miscellaneous
Table 3.2: Other Security Issues/Attacks
3.1.2 Test Cases Structure
A mining tool was implemented aiming the search of security patterns and resulting informa-
tion to produce and evaluate candidates to test cases. More detailed information about the mining
tool will be provided on chapter 4.
Every time a pattern was found in a commit, a candidate to a test case was added to the main
database. Due to the way of how Github is structured, it is easy to track the differences between
each pair of commits. This methodology considers the commit containg the pattern as the fix of
the vulnerability and the previous one as the actual vulnerability, i.e., the sample containing the
1https://tqrg.github.io/secbench/patterns.html
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source code to be scanned by a SAT. Each test case has 3 folders: Vf ix with the non-vulnerable
source code from the commit where the pattern was identified (child), Vvul with the vulnerable
source code from the previous commit (parent) which it is believed to be the real vulnerability;
and, Vdi f f with two folders, added and deleted, containing the added lines to fix the vulnerability
and the deleted lines representing the security vulnerability (Fig. 3.2).
Figure 3.2: Difference between Vf ix, Vvul and Vdi f f
3.1.3 Samples Evaluation and Acceptance Criteria
After obtaining the sample and its information, a manual evaluation was performed on the diff
between Vf ix and Vvul . For each single case, firstly it was necessary to evaluate if the message
really reflected indications of a vulnerability fix because some of the combinations represented by
the regular expressions can lead to false positives, i.e., messages that do not represent the actual
vulnerability fix. The fact that the same word can mention different things led to more garbage,
i.e., commits referring other things but using the same words. If the conclusion from the first stage
(message evaluation) is No, then the test case was marked in the database as a non viable test
case. But if the analysis succeeds, the code evaluation is performed through the diff source code
analysis. Hopefully, the researcher is capable of isolating manually the functions or problems
in the code responsible for the fix and the vulnerability. During the study, several cases were
inconclusive, mainly due to the difficulties on understanding the code structure or when the source
code did not reflected the message. Normally, these last cases were marked has non viable, except
when there was something that could be the fix but the researcher did not get it. In that cases, they
were putted on hold as a doubt which means that the case needs more research.
To validate the source code much research was made on books, security cheatsheets online,
vulnerabilities dictionary websites and many others sources of knowledge. Normally, the process
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would be giving a first look on the code trying to highlight a few functions or problems that
could represent the vulnerability, and then making a search on the internet based on the language,
frameworks and information obtained by the diff.
Besides the validation, the set of requirements presented below needs to be fulfilled, in order
to approve a test case as viable to the final test suite:
• The vulnerability belongs to the class where it is being evaluated
If it does not belong to the class in evaluation the vulnerability is put on hold for later study
except if the class under evaluation is the miscellaneous class which was made to mine
vulnerabilities that might not belong to the other patterns; or, to catch vulnerabilities that
may skip in other patterns due to the limitations of using regular expressions in this case.
• The vulnerability is isolated
We accepted vulnerabilities which additionally include the implementation of other features,
refactoring or even fixing of several security vulnerabilities. But the majority of security
vulnerabilities founded are identified by the files names and lines where they are positioned.
We assume all Vf ix is necessary to fix the security vulnerability.
• The vulnerability needs to really exist
Each sample was evaluated to see if it is a real vulnerability or not. During the analysis
of several samples, a few commits were not related to security vulnerabilities and fixes of
vulnerabilities, i.e., no real fixes were identified.
3.1.4 Database Manual Evaluation Limitations
Sometimes, developers have hard-times when trying to understand the code from other devel-
opers. This is easily explained by the high variety of APIs, frameworks, languages and libraries
available to produce software. So, it is safe to say that this methodology will benefit from people
with experience on using different components. The requirements were all evaluated manually,
hence a threat to the validity as it can lead to human errors (e.g., bad evaluations of the security
vulnerabilities). However, we attempted to be really meticulous during the evaluation and when
we were not sure about the security vulnerability nature we evaluated as a doubt and as a replica
when we detected a replication of other commit (e.g., merges or the same commit in other pattern).
Sometimes it was hard to reassign the commits due to the similarity between some patterns (e.g.,
ucwkv and upapi) on OWASP top 10. Another challenge was the trash (i.e., commits that did not
represent vulnerabilities) that came with the mining process due to the use of regular expressions.
Garbage (non-viable test cases) represent more than 50% of the mining process outcome. We only
used regular expressions because of time restrictions.
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3.2 SATs Evaluation and Study
The second stage of the methodology corresponds to the SATs study which is based on the
CAS Static Analysis Tool Study [fAS11] but instead of aritifical test cases, real ones were used,
i.e., test cases representing naturally occurring security vulnerabilities. The similarity between
this methodology and the one presented by the National Security Agency is the group of metrics
used to evaluate the tool: precision, recall and f-score (Sec. 1.3).
In the beginning, it was necessary to do a state-of-the-art study (Sec. 2.5.4) to understand the
characteristics of these tools. Later on, some points were taken in consideration to evaluate tools
as good candidates to this study (Sec 3.2.1).
After obtaining a good candidate, the vulnerabilities support and models were studied in order
to identify good test cases to study the tool, i.e., good representatives of what vulnerabilities the
tool is able to detected (not only at pattern level but also specificity). It doesn’t matter if it is a
memory leak, if the allocation function is not part of the models.
Leaning on this, each test case suffered a deep manual evaluation to identify possible vulner-
abilities on the diff between the two commits. Some test cases were not only representative of
one vulnerability. Actually, the percentage of test cases containing more than one vulnerability is
lower than the percentage of test cases representing several vulnerabilities. So, it was necessary to
identify and isolate the possible and suitable vulnerabilities on the vulnerable source code.
Then, depending on the tool the source code is build and sent to the static analyzer (tool).
The tool reports the detected vulnerabilities and another manual evaluation is performed by a
researcher to understand if the tool did or did not report the vulnerabilities or if it reported false
alarms, i.e., non-existent vulnerabilities. Each result is evaluated as TP, FN and FP (Sec. 1.3).
Based on these results, the metrics mentioned before can be calculated and the tool’s quality
can be determined.
Figure 3.3: SATs study methodology overview
3.2.1 Identifying Good Candidates
In order to identify static analysis tools that would suit well this methodology, a set of require-
ments needs to be fullfield:
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• The SAT must be open-source
Since this methodology tries to study SATs, it is indispensable to have access to the code
to better understand the models and flows each tool identifies. Due to the primitiveness of
these tools, the core developers do not waste too much time on producing documentation,
or if it exists it is more an overview than a complex description of what researchers need to
know. So it is hard to have a deeper knowledge of how the tool operates and what it could
be expected when running a code sample.
• The SAT must detect vulnerabilities that can be found on Github repositories
SATs are being studied using test cases mined from Github. Thus, it is necessary to ensure a
minimum set of test cases to be used on the tool study. Due to the vulnerabilities specificity
caught by the tool, test cases may not be available.
• The SAT must be used by a considerable amount of people
If the final goal of this methodology is to decrease the costs involved on the identification
of vulnerabilities and improve developers lives, then it is mainly important to study and
improve tools that are already being used by a good number of developers.
Other than analyzing if the SAT s fulfil the list of requirements, they were also organized and
chosen by their popularity, companies support (e.g., Facebook, Google, Spotify and many others),
contributors community and the most important the relevance of the vulnerabilities caught. It is
important to start with vulnerabilities that have a high impact on the security field since the impact
will be higher.
3.2.2 Identifying Vulnerabilities and SAT Results Evaluation
As mentioned before, the group of suitable test cases goes through a deep evaluation in order
to isolate possible vulnerabilities on the source code. So, for each type of vulnerability under
evaluation, the possible vulnerabilities are highlighted. As you can see on figure 3.4, the socket
identifier is no longer available after line 182 and line 190, so it is necessary to close the socket
before the function returns, in order to tackle the two resource leaks identified. This is the process
used for all the samples before being analyzed with the SATs .
The example presented below is easy to identify. It was not always like this, sometimes it was
really difficult to understand were the issues were due to the source code complexity. The source
code quality really matters.
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Figure 3.4: Example of several vulnerabilities identification
After isolating the vulnerabilities, the sample is scanned with a SAT and the results are also
manually evaluated. Based on the comparison between the expected vulnerabilities and the actual
results we evaluate each case as FP if a vulnerability is caught but it does not exist; FN if the
tool should have caught the vulnerability but it didn’t; and, TP if the expected vulnerability was
identified. These results were used on the metrics calculation which determines if the tool is
reliable (precision), sensitive (recall) and, mainly, good or bad (f-score).
3.2.3 SATs Evaluation Limitations
When identifying security vulnerabilities on the test cases, some complex examples were
founded which were not evaluated by a SAT even when it would suit the models tool. The code
structure and external components sometimes did not help on understanding if the tool would
caught the vulnerabilities or not, so not all test cases from the test suite were used to test the tool.
Some tools build the code before the analysis, so the test cases need to be build successfully. The
problem is that a few samples were not build successfully due to original software problems. This
was an issue because sometimes it was difficult to understand if the problem was from the sample
or from the computer used to perform the analysis. This was solved through research on the inter-
net; github repositories and issues. This led to the decrease of available and suitable test cases to
perform the study.
The results of the SATs sometimes were not really well presented, so it was simply difficult
to know how to classify the result. In that times, we dropped the test case from the SAT study.
One example, was the SAT pointing the wrong function which nothing had to do with the real
vulnerability. This case was not a false alarm and other cases2 like this were reported on the tool
github repository issues. The bad interfaces make the study and their application harder.
2https://github.com/facebook/infer/issues/648
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The specificity of the vulnerabilities scanned by a SAT was also a limitation. For example, it
was very hard to find samples to study the Find-Sec-Bugs tool since it caughts very specific
functions and CWE classes. In the sample presented on this study, 0 CWE identifiers were identi-
fied. Not sucessfully or even unsucessfully. In order to find vulnerabilities to study this tool it will
be necessary to had other means of identifying such specificity. Maybe checking the import files
would be a great path, since developers on Github, normally do not detail so much the commits’
messages.
3.3 SATs Modernization
The last stage of the methodology was to evaluate if it is possible to obtain points of improve-
ment within the results of the studied test cases.
Analyzing the SAT results and the information the tool provides online (e.g., source code,
documentation, etc), we tried to understand why the tool did not work and how to solve it. It is
really important to understand well how the tool really works and how the identification process is
made (e.g., Infer uses Hoare Logic and Interprocedural analysis). Hopefully, with the problems
caught using this methodology, improvements and contributions can be done on the studied tool
were we had positive outcomes.
3.4 Conclusions
As observed in the previous sections, this is a very meticulous and long methodology with
potential to succed but at the same time with several limitations associated. Being the major and
probably the most dangerous the high dependency on humans. Github can be also a problem, due
to the way of how it is structured. Researchers are not able to identify the best repositories to mine
and with the higher quality. Due to its dimension it is pretty hard to get that kind of information.
It is important to have a benchmark with real security vulnerabilities, but it is also necessary
to improve the way of how we identify vulnerabilities since it is too much time-consuming and
dependent on humans which inserts high rates of errors.
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Chapter 4
Tools and Database Implementation
To support this research, a few components were implemented to save, manage and collect
information. First, a database was designed in order to host the information provided by Github.
Then, a mining tool was created to extract data. In order to validate data and obtain non-inflated
data, several scripts were created. And, finally, a website was created to present the statistical
results.
In the next sections, all of these components will be presented in detail: database structure,
mining tool, data validation and data visualization.
4.1 Overview
In order to perform the study, two different applications were created to comunicate with the
database:
• secbench-mining-tool1: Mining tool responsible for extracting information from Github
based on a chosen pattern. This tool is responsible for the data collection and its organiza-
tion.
• secbench2: Website containing all the statistical results and scripts responsible for vali-
dating data. (Note: At the moment, only the patterns information is available. The website
is running locally but it will be deployed soon.)
Both communicate with the database in order to insert and retrieve data which will be used to
obtain usefull information (Fig. 4.1). For mining Github, there are two different scripts. One to
mine repositories informations and other to mine patterns on repository commits. secbench is
responsible for retrieving and provide information in a visual. Validation was a major concern in
order to make sure that the retrieved data was the most reliable as possible.
1https://github.com/TQRG/secbench-mining-tool
2https://github.com/TQRG/secbench
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Figure 4.1: Different modules and applications produced to obtain and visualize the results
The majority of technologies used in this thesis are OSS and the final product will be also
OSS. The final versions of the software will be all available on Github. The resulting benchmark
is under a MIT License. A wide range of technologies was used to create the componentes:
• Database
– Redis3: Advanced key-store value datastore written in C (very fast). It supports
several different data types and handles clients concurrency well. It has one of the
most efficient cache management systems within NoSQL databases.
• Mining Tool and Data Validation
– Python4: Programming language with a large standard library containing several
packages for data mining and statistics.
– Github API5: The connection between Github and the application was made through
two different packages GitPython6 to download the code samples and PyGitHub7
to obtain the data provided by the API.
– Google Cloud Storage API8: The samples of code mined from Github were
stored on Google Cloud.
• Data Visualization
– D3.js9: JavaScript library used to manipulate and visualize information.
3https://github.com/antirez/redis
4https://www.python.org/
5https://developer.github.com/v3/
6https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython
7https://github.com/PyGithub/PyGithub
8https://cloud.google.com/storage/docs/reference/libraries
9https://github.com/d3/d3
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– Flask10: Flask is a microframework for Python and was used to create the web
server behind the website.
– SciPy11: Group of several Python packages used for statistics.
4.2 Database Structure
Currently, the database contains almost 25K keys with different types of information. Here,
the structure of the database is presented in detail. Redis allows you to design and store your data
using different data types: strings, hashes, lists, sets and sorted sets.
4.2.1 Repository
Each repository is represented by a hash (map between string fields and string values) with a
key identifier equal to:
repo:<repository_owner>:<repository_name>:<repository_status>
where <repository_owner> is the name of the owner of the project, <repository_name> is the
name of the repository and <repository_status> is the status of the project which may be n (5K
keys), if it has no problems; i (95 keys), if it is empty or blocked; and, s (27 keys), if it has less
than two commits.
For each repository in general, there are three different fields: owner = <repository_owner>,
name = <repository_name> and status = <repository_status>. The repositories with status equal
to n have more fields than the ones mentioned before (Tab. 4.1).
Field Value
started Datetime of the first commit
last_update Datetime of the last commit
forked? Is the repository a fork? Yes or No
forked_from Owner and name of the original repository
dev_time Difference between the first commit and last one (seconds)
branch Branch name
commits Number of commits
languages JSON with all languages and respective BOC
Table 4.1: Repository hash fields
In order to track the patterns mined for each repository, a list was created:
class:<repository_owner>:<repository_name>
10http://flask.pocoo.org/
11https://www.scipy.org/
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where a class was added every time it was mined.
For each language (set) present in the database, it is possible to see all the repositories which
have it on their languages. The key representing a language is:
lang:<language>
where <language> is a programming language like Java, JavaScript, C, etc. The keys added
to this set are the keys identifying the repositories.
4.2.2 Commit
A commit is represented by a hash with a key identifier equal to:
commit:<repository_owner>:<repository_name>:<commit_sha>:<pattern>
where <repository_owner> is the name of the owner of the project, <repository_name> is the
name of the repository and <commit_sha> is the commit sha key and <pattern> is the type of
security vulnerability (e.g., xss, csrf, etc).
There are more than 7.5k commits on the database where almost 6k are already studied. The
fields each commit contains are several (Tab. 4.2).
Field Value
lang Language of the file where is the vulnerability
year Year of the commit
class Type of vulnerability
message Commit message
match Commit match between the message and the regular expression
vuln? Has the commit a vulnerability? Yes, No, Doubt or Replication
sha-p Commit parent
commit_url URL of the vulnerability
id_f ID on Google Cloud folder
code If it is an identified vulnerability by CVE or CWE
observations Observations of anything about the commit
Table 4.2: Commit hash fields
4.2.3 Tool Results
For each tool is created a list with its own name as a key. For example, the key for finding
infer results keys is infer. If you do,
lrange 0 -1 infer
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it will retrieve the keys of all vulnerabilities studied for infer. Each vulnerability is represented
with a hash with the next structure:
vulns:<repository_owner>:<repository_name>:<commit_sha>:<pattern>:<id>
where <repository_owner> is the name of the owner of the project, <repository_name> is the
name of the repository and <commit_sha> is the commit sha key, <pattern> is the type of security
vulnerability (e.g., xss, csrf, etc) and <id> is the number of the vulnerability in the commit.
The fields that were saved for each vulnerability is presented below (Tab. 4.3):
Field Value
line Line where the vulnerability is
file Path of the file which has the vulnerability
lang Vulnerability language
observations Normally, the explanation of why it is a vulnerability
id_f Identifier on Google Cloud
res Tool report TP, FP or FN
Table 4.3: Vulnerability hash fields
4.2.4 Experiments
Since different experiments were made, a hash was created in order to track the database
inserts. The key for an experiment is:
exp:<pattern>:<repository_owner>:<repository_name>:<datetime>
where <pattern> is the type of security vulnerability (e.g., xss, csrf, etc), <repository_owner>
is the name of the owner of the project, <repository_name> is the name of the repository and
<datetime> is the date and time when the experiment ended.
The information tracked for each experiment (Tab. 4.4):
Field Value
c_time Datetime when the experiment ended
class Class for what it was mined
repo_owner Repository owner name
repo_name Repository name
time_spent Time spent on mining the class
n_vuls Number of vulnerabilities caught
Table 4.4: Experiment hash fields
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4.3 Mining Tool
The mining tool allowed to retrieve the necessary information from Github, in order to create
our own database. This tool communicates with several external componentes: the Github API
throught two python packages (GitPython and PyGithub); the database in Redis where is the
information retrieved and the Google Cloud Storage API to save the test cases.
This tool has two main scripts:
• get_github_repositories.py: Script responsible for collecting Github repositories and adding
their information to the database. The mining can be done iteratively starting in a Github
page and mining x repositories from there. You can search for repositories with the string
"Language: <language>" and obtain x repositories in the language you want. Or, you can
add a specific repository to the database using its owner and name.
• repos_miner.py: Script responsible for collecting vulnerabilities based on a pattern. You
can mine repositories for all patterns or selecting a specific pattern. This script collects
information only for the repositories on the database.
4.3.1 Mining Repositories
The mining tool iterates all the commits of each repository and matches the message of each
commit with a regular expression representing a security pattern. If the match succeeds it means
that a vulnerability fix was caught. If the vulnerability is not already in the database, it is added to
the database and the sample is sent to a bucket on the cloud. As seen on figure 4.2, if a vulnerability
fix is caught on a commit, then the real vulnerability will be on the parent. This is what we believe.
Each pattern mined for a repository is considered as a new experiment.
Figure 4.2: Github structure and vulnerabilities detection
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There is one limitation associated with the tool due to how Github is structured. When a
vulnerability is caught on a merge, the tool is not able to detect which of the parents is the one
who has the vulnerability (Fig. 4.3). Research was made and no infallible solution was found.
Thus, through the manual evaluation the parent is checked in order to address the issue and correct
sha-p value.
Figure 4.3: Merge of more than one commit at the same time
Merges can not be dropped from the research since in some repositories reflect the correction
of bad commits descriptions, i.e., when one of the core developers reviews the code and submits
it, it adds specific messages for each fix. This conclusion was taken from the manual analysis of
several merges and its parents.
4.3.2 Test Cases Structure on the Cloud
The test cases in the cloud are separated by patterns. Inside of each pattern (e.g., auth), there
is a folder for each language (e.g., C) where the pattern was caught. Then, the user can check the
repositories (e.g., google_google-authenticator) inside that provided viable test cases following
the structure presented in the previous chapter (Fig. 3.2).
Figure 4.4: Difference between Vf ix, Vvul and Vdi f f on the cloud
4.4 Data Validation
Every single commit studied on our database went through a manual evaluation which was
one of the main stages of data validation where all the information was confirmed and complete.
In order to maintain the database and cloud data clean and useful, a few validation methods were
used:
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• Consistency checks on fields where the values were previously defined (e.g, vuln?, code,
etc).
• Due to the limitation presented on fig. 4.3, the test cases were manually evaluated in order
to see which of the parents could be the one containing the vulnerability.
• File existence check: some test cases were missing files due to the non correct handling of
exceptions in the early stages.
• A few times we corrected the missing packages on the cloud.
• Every 2 weeks, we ran a script in order to clean the non-viable samples form the cloud.
• Cardinality checks: Scripts to check if the information is in the right number or if there is
any garbage ruining the data (e.g., if the total number of accepted vulnerablities is equal to
the sum of vulnerabilities for each pattern on the database)
4.5 Data Visualization
In order to visualize data, a website was created with a webserver in Flask. Several requests
were created to obtain data from the database. D3.jswas used to create different types of graphics
(Fig. 4.5) with this information: bar charts, bubble charts, stacked bar charts and scatterplots with
regression lines.
Figure 4.5: Example of bar chart uisng D3.js
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Empirical Evaluation
In this section, the resulting statistics of putting the methodology in practice are reported and
discussed. Here, it is possible to have an overview of the database characteristics, a few interesting
relationships between variables and the statistical reports of the tools studied.
Under this empirical evaluation, there is a sample from the final database which contains the
mined and evaluated content for the higher viable number of patterns, i.e., patterns which were
succesfully able to retrieve test cases. There is a group of repositories that is not yet mined for all
the patterns, so they are not being considered but will possibly integrate the final benchmark in the
future.
The first version of the benchmark is already available on https://github.com/TQRG/
secbench containing all the test cases collected from 238 projects. The sample used under the
next evaluation has a few more test cases which were the result of mining 10 more repositories.
5.1 SecBench Report
This section provides an overview of the sample characteristics used to the empirical evalu-
ation and all the interesting information and conclusions collected from the study. This sample
belongs to the main database whose name is SecBench (the junction of Security and Benchmark)
and which already counts with more than 700 accepted vulnerabilities and almost 6K mined com-
mits manually evaluated.
The first entry on this database was on March 25 and the last one on June 19 with a mean of
mining hours per day equal to 6 hours and 21 minutes.
5.1.1 How was the database sample chosen?
In order to provide reliable and helpfull information about the data collected through the last
months, a sample was chosen based on one requirement:
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• All the chosen repositories must be mined for all patterns which retrieved viable infor-
mation, i.e., only repositories mined for all the patterns with more than one vulnerability
accepted were taking into account.
For example, the pattern representing context leaks, which is an Android vulnerability, was
not taking in consideration for this study since after 248 mined repositories the resulting accepted
vulnerabilities were 0.
In order to obtain a sample which could be a good representative of the population under study,
it was ensured the top 5 of most popular programming languages on Github and different sizes of
repositories were covered. Due to the large amount of Github repositories (61M) and constant
modification it is very complicate to have an overall of the exact characteristics that the sample
under study should have in order to, approximately, represent Github.
The chosen sample supports more than 94 programming languages where the top 5 (JavaScript,
Java, Python, Ruby and PHP) was definitely covered, as you can see on figure 5.1 where only the
languages with more than 10M of bytes of code (BOC) are presented.
The Github API does not allow to retrieve the number of commits in each language for each
repository. Instead, it retrieves the number of BOC written in each repository language.
Figure 5.1: Top 13 of the most mined languages in bytes of code (BOC)
There is a high number of BOC for C language due to the extensive search of memory and
resource leaks test cases to study a SAT.
The repositories contained on the sample have different sizes from 2 commits to almost 700K
commits. It would be expected that the result of mining larger repositories would easily lead to
more primitive data. But since the goal is to have a good representation of the whole Github, it
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is necessary to also contain the smaller repositories, in order to reach balanced conclusions and
predictions.
5.1.2 Real Security Vulnerabilities Distributions
As mentioned before, this is already the second version of the benchmark which contains 682
real security vulnerabilities, the result of mining 248 Github repositories - the equivalent to almost
2M of commits, more specifically 1978482 commits - covering 16 different and previously defined
vulnerability patterns (Tab. 3.1, 3.2).
From the sample under evaluation, a few interesting distributions between the accepted num-
ber of vulnerabilities and other variables were obtained. Some of them reflect real information
which were already reported by other studies and others contribute with new insights related to
OSS. Since a small sample is being evaluated, it is necessary to understand that these values may
not represent exactly the domain (Github). The distributions presented below are per year (Sec.
5.1.2.1), language (Sec. 5.1.2.2) and pattern (Sec. 5.1.2.3).
5.1.2.1 Year
SecBench includes security vulnerabilities from 1999 until now (2017), being the group of
years between 2012 and 2016 the one with most accepted vulnerabilities (Fig. 5.2), especially
2014 with a percentage of 14.37%. This supports the IBM’s X-Force Threat Intelligence 2017
Report [USA17] where it is conclude that in the last 5 years the number of vulnerabilities per
year had an overall significant increasing compared with the other years. It is also important to
highlight that 2017 has already a considerable percentage (4.25%) of accepted vulnerabilities even
though we have yet 6 months until the end of the year.
Based on these results, the percentage of real security vulnerabilities has been increasing over
almost the past 20 years, with a peak on 2007 which according to the CISCO’s Security Anual
Report from 2007 [CIS07], it was a year marked by vulnerabilities with higher severity (i.e., the
potential impact of a successful exploitation) compared with the previous ones.
The decreasing of security vulnerabilities in the last 2 years does not reflect the news and secu-
rity reports. However, these reports englobe all kinds of software and the study is only performed
on OSS. The decreasing can reflect the concerns of the core developers within making the code
public, since the number of attacks is increasing and one of potential causes is the code availability.
Except for 2000, it was possible to collect test cases for all years between 1999 and 2017 being
the last years the most popular (2017, exclusively for now).
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Figure 5.2: Distribution of real security vulnerabilities per year
Figure 5.3: Distribution of real security vulnerabilities per language
5.1.2.2 Language
The sample covers more than 12 different languages being PHP (42.38%), C (23.75%), and
Ruby (12.9%) the languages with higher number of test cases (Fig. 5.3) which reflects the values
46
Empirical Evaluation
of BOC presented on figure 5.1 for C and PHP. Two of the languages with higher values of BOC are
also languages with higher percentages of accepted vulnerabilities. However, C is by far the most
mined language and it is the second language with higher percentage of accepted vulnerabilities.
These values can be the result of several things: the type of mined patterns, since more than 50%
of the patterns target web applications; the time when the repositories were migrated or created on
Github, i.e., software migrated after years of development with lots of C files but small number of
commits; low number of active repositories on Github compared with languages like JavaScript or
Ruby; or, even the fact that vulnerabilities from low level languages are more difficult to identify
since their focus are mainly memory management which is not a major concern on higher level
languages.
The top 5 of the most popular programming languages are all included on the top 6 of the
programming languages with higher percentage of accepted vulnerabilities which proves that the
assumption about retrieving more easily primitive data based on the top of most popular program-
ming languages is true.
This supports the higher percentage of security vulnerabilities caught for xss (20.67%), injec
(14.81%) and ml (12.46%) (Fig. 5.4) since C is a language where memory leaks are predominant
and Ruby and PHP are scripting languages where Injection and Cross-Site Scripting are popular
vulnerabilities.
Although the database contains 94 different languages, it only was able to collect viable infor-
mation for 12 different languages.
5.1.2.3 Pattern
After mining and evaluating the samples, the results for 16 different patterns were obtained
being the two main groups the ones presented on figure 5.4, Top 10 OWASP and others. xss
(20.67%), injec (14.81%) and ml (12.46%) are the trendiest patterns on OSS which is curious
since injec takes the first place on Top 10 OWASP 2017 [Fou17] and xss the second. ml does not
integrate the top because it is not a vulnerability normally found on web applications.
Injection and Cross-Site Scripting are easy vulnerabilities to catch since the exploits are sim-
ilar and exist, mainly, due to the lack of data sanitization which oftentimes is forgotten by the
developers. The only difference between the two is the side from where the exploit is done (server
or client).
Memory leaks exist because developers do not manage memory allocations and deallocations
correctly. These kind of issues are one of the main reasons of dos attacks and regularly appeared
on the manual evaluations even in the misc class. Although these three patterns are easy to fix, the
protection against them is also typically forgotten.
Another prevalent pattern and which is not being considered is misc because it englobes all the
other vulnerabilities and attacks found that do not belong to any of the chosen patterns or whose
place was not yet well-defined. One example of vulnerabilities that you can find on misc (14.37%)
are vulnerabilities that can lead to timing attacks where an attacker can retrieve information about
the system through the analysis of the time taken to execute cryptographic algorithms. Normally,
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the fix is the exchange of the function by another one with constant-time complexity. There is
already material that can possibly result in new patterns through the misc class analysis.
Figure 5.4: Distribution of real security vulnerabilities by pattern
Although auth (6.6%) is taking the second place on Top 10 OWASP 2017, it was not easy to
find samples that resemble this pattern maybe because of the fact that highlighting these issues on
Github can reveal other ones in their session management mechanisms and, consequently, lead-
ing to session hijacking attacks. The csrf (4.99%) and dos (6.16%) patterns are seen frequently
among Github repositories: adding protection through unpredictable tokens and fixing several
issues which lead to denial-of-service attacks.
The most critical patterns to extract are definitely bac (0.29%), which detects unproved access
to sensitive data without enforcements; upapi (1.03%), which detects the addition of mechanisms
to handle and answer to automated attacks; and, smis (1.32%) involving default information on
unprotected files or unused pages that can give unauthorized access to attackers.
rl (1.76%) is another pattern whose extraction was hard. Although, memory leaks are resource
leaks, here only the vulnerabilities related with the need of closing files, sockets, connections, etc,
were considered.
The other patterns (e.g., sde, iap, ucwkv, over and pathtrav) were pretty common during our
evaluation process and also on our Github searches. The over pattern contains vulnerabilities for
several types of overflow: heap, stack, integer and buffer.
Other interesting point here is the considerable percentage of iap (2.49%), which normally is
the addition of methods to detect attacks. This is the first time that iap makes part of the top 10
OWASP 2017 and still we were able to detect more vulnerabilities for that pattern, than for bac
which was already present in 2003 and 2004.
From 248 projects, the methodology was able to collect 682 vulnerabilities for 16 different
patterns.
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5.1.3 Identified Vulnerabilities by CVE and CWE
Several identified and reported vulnerabilities can also be find on this database. In fact,
15.4%(105) of the current database are vulnerabilities identified by CVE on 12 different years
for 98 different CVEs. The database counts with already 4 identified vulnerabilities for 2017.
Two of them are the CVE-2017-7620 where the omition of a backslash allows permalink injec-
tion through CSRF attacks; or open redirects via login_page.php?return = URI; and, the CVE-
2017-3733 where an encryptation vulnerability would lead OpenSSL to crash affecting clients and
servers.
Again, there is a significant increasing of vulnerabilities in the last years which can be seen on
table 5.1. The range between 2016 and 2013 reflects more than 50% of the CVEs identified, i.e.,
these 4 years (1/3 of time) contain 67.62% of the identified vulnerabilities.
Year 2017 2016 2015 2014 2013 2012 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006
#CVE 4 20 13 22 16 9 9 5 2 3 1 1
Table 5.1: Vulnerabilities identified with CVE
In almost 6K commits manually evaluated, the identifier for weaknesses (CWE) or reference
to that never appeared which reflects the search made through Github that retrieved only 12K of
commits with messages containing CWE and 2M for CVE.
5.1.4 Mined and Accepted Vunerabilities within Repositories
As a result of the mining process for the 16 different patterns (Tab. 5.2), 62.5% of the reposi-
tories contain vulnerabilities (VRepositories) and 37.5% do not contain vulnerabilities.
#Vulns #Repositories Repositories (%)
> 0 155 62.5%
= 0 93 37.5%
Total 248 100%
Table 5.2: Mined Vulnerabilities Distribution
After mining the repositories, the manual evaluation was perfomed where each candidate had
to fulfill a group of requirements (Chap. 3). Here, as we can see on table 5.3, the percentage
of success, i.e., repositories containing vulnerability, decreases to 54.19%. The approximated
difference of 8% is due to the cleaning process made through the evaluation process where a
human tries to understand if the actual code fixes and represents a security vulnerability or not.
Although the decreasing from one process to another, we can still obtain a considerable per-
centage (more than one half) of VRepositories containing real vulnerabilities.
49
Empirical Evaluation
#AVulns #VRepositories VRepositories (%)
> 0 84 54.19%
= 0 71 45.81%
Total 155 100%
Table 5.3: Accepted Vulnerabilities (AVulns) Distribution
In the end, we were able to extract vulnerabilities with an existence ratio of≈ 2.75 (682/248).
The current number of repositories on Github is 61M, so based on the previous ratio we can
possibly obtain a database of ≈ 168 billions (167750M) of real security vulnerabilities which is
≈ 246 thousand (245967) times higher than the current database.
5.1.5 Regular Expression Efficiency
Each resulting case from the mining process was evaluated and classified with one of 4 status:
Yes, when the case fulfilled all the requirements; No, when it has no indications of a vulnerability
(e.g., documentation, refactoring and many other causes); Doubt, when it seemed to be a vulner-
ability but the human evaluating was not sure about it; and, Replication, when the commit was a
replication of other commits (e.g., github merges of different commits).
In order to recognize patterns on commits messages, regular expressions were used. As ex-
pected (Fig. 5.5), more than 50% of the results obtained are garbage (N or R) for all patterns. This
reflects the difficulty found on getting viable test cases within all the mining resulting commits.
This is a highly time-consuming task and not accurate at all. But due to the time restrictions asso-
ciated to the thesis developement, first the main goal was to prove the hypothesis since it is a long
process. In order to improve these results, it will be necessary to use other techniques like natural
language processing to add understanding of semantics to the tool and hopefully decrease the time
and effort associated to the task.
The evaluation performed on figure 5.5 and figure 5.6 does not contain one of the projects
involved on the sample under study since it is the result of bad mining and would compromise the
analysis.
These are the results for all the variations of regular expressions, since their early stages. How-
ever, they were adapted according to the level of garbage collected through the mining process.
For example, for the misc pattern the program would check fix.* sec.* warning but in a
specific project this got a lot of commits whose messages contained the string fix second mismatch-
ing warning which had nothing to do with a vulnerability but it appeared a lot through the manual
evaluation. Thus, the regular expression was changed to fix.* secur.* warning and the is-
sue was solved ignoring those type of commits. There was a problem on balancing the specificity
of some words used on the patterns and the gargabe or non caught vulnerabilities. Sometimes we
would specify too much a pattern and then no commits would be caught when the vulnerabilities
were there. So, we tried to have a balence.
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Figure 5.5: Distribution between mined commits and their current state without reallocating vul-
nerabilities
Figure 5.6: Distribution between mined commits and their current state after reallocating vulner-
abilities
The difference between figure 5.5 and figure 5.6 is that in the first one the values do not
consider when the pattern vulnerability was changed, i.e., if a vulnerability was caught in the
wrong place and then changed to the right one. Through the vulnerabilities manual evaluation,
some of them were reallocated to other patterns, mainly, vulnerabilities caught on misc pattern.
On figure 5.6, we can see higher values of Y for the majority of patterns.
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Many vulnerabilities caught on misc belonged to other patterns because of the identified vul-
nerabilities (CVE) and the use of words like attack and vulnerable.
5.1.6 Correlations
Based on the current sample, we tried to understand if there is any correlation between the
number of mined commits deteting a vulnerability and the time of development; and, between the
number of vulnerabilities accepted and the time of development.
The correlation coefficient value increases after the manual evaluation, i.e., after filtering com-
mits and accepting vulnerabilities. There is a medium positive correlation between both dependent
variables. It seems that the correlation is stronger for projects with a time of development with
size lower than 12 years. After 12 years, there is a less number of repositories without commits
and vulnerabilities accepted. But at the same time, the correlation it is lower since there are repos-
itories with less time of development with higher number of test cases. The level of dispersion is
higher after 12 years (Fig. 5.7).
Figure 5.7: Distribution between mined commits and the time of development (1) and vulnerabil-
ities accepted and the time of development (2)
Figure 5.8: Distribution between mined commits and the repository size (1) and vulnerabilities
accepted and the repository size (2)
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Comparing the repository size and the number of mined commits and the repository size with
the number of vulnerabilities accepted, it does not exist correlation for larger repositories. How-
ever, it is a positive correlation which says that the dependent variables increase along with the
repository size (number of commits) (Fig. 5.8).
Except for lower values of repository size and time of development, the correlations are too
small. The medium correlations are due to the results obtained for lower values of independent
variables. But it seems that in general the number of mined commits and vulnerabilities accepted
increases according to the indepedent variables (repository size and time of development).
The sample under study is too small and will benefit from adding more repositories to the
sample since this may not reflect the all domain.
5.2 Static Analysis Tools Report
In order to understand if it is viable to study SATs using this methodology, two tools were
studied in the best way possible using this sample: Infer1 and Find-Sec-Bugs2.
5.2.1 SAT: Infer
This tool was chosen due to its popularity on Github, the company behind (Facebook) and
because it tries to catch one of the vulnerabilities that are one of the main causes of Denial-of-
Service attacks.
Infer catches memory leaks, resource leaks and null dereference vulnerabilities. Unfort-
natelly, this methodology was not able to find a considerable amount of null dereference vulnera-
bilities. So, they won’t be studied.
This tool also searches for memory leaks in C++ but it is still very primitive. On Github Issues,
the core developers advised several times developers to not use the C++ analysis yet. They are
still working on it.
5.2.1.1 Memory Leaks
27 vulnerabilities were extracted from 10 test cases (4 for Objective-C and 6 for C). Infer
only identifies memory leaks in C if variables are initilialized with malloc, realloc and calloc.
Objective-C memory leaks are only reported if objects were created using Core Foundation or
Core Graphics and not released.
1http://fbinfer.com/
2http://find-sec-bugs.github.io/
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Figure 5.9: Distribution of FP, TP and FN on detecting memory leaks by Infer for C (1) and
Objective-C (2)
In order to study the tool, we were only able to use 4 of 15 test cases for memory leaks in
Objective-C and 6 of 33 test cases for memory leaks in C. We were not able to detect TP for
memory leaks in Objective-C.
When identifying memory leaks on C source code, the percentage of FP and FN overcomes the
percentage of TP (Fig. 5.9) which reflects the bad performance reported by other studies before.
Language Precision (pr) Recall (r) F-Score( f s) #Vulns
C 0.875 0.368 0.519 20
Objective-C 0 0 0 7
Table 5.4: Infer: Resulting metrics for memory leaks
Since 0 TPs were identified by Infer for memory leaks in Objective-C, its precision, recall
and f-score are zero. This could mean that the tool does not perform good (value far from 1) when
looking for memory leaks in Objective-C but 7 vulnerabilities it is not a considerable amount of
vulnerabilities to make such conclusion.
Although, Infer has a precision of 0.875 for memory leaks identification that shows a consid-
erable amount of reliability, it also shows a small capability of correctly identifying vulnerabilities
(0.368). Thus, based on its F-Score we can conclude that Infer is an average tool for memory
leaks identification in C.
5.2.1.2 Resource Leaks
19 vulnerabilities were extracted from 8 test cases (4 for C and 4 for Java). Infer only
identifies resource leaks in C when resources are entities such as files, sockets and connections that
need to be closed after being used. Resource Leaks for Java are, normally, caught for exceptions
skipping past close() statements.
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Figure 5.10: Distribution of FP, TP and FN on detecting resource leaks by Infer for C (1) and
Java (2)
We were only able to use 4 of 22 test cases for resource leaks in C and 4 of 8 test cases for
resource leaks in Java. We were able to caught TP for the two samples but 0 FP for resource leaks
in Java.
When identifying resource leaks on C and Java source code, the percentage of FP and FN
overcomes the percentage of TP (Fig. 5.10) which again reflects the bad performance reported by
other studies before.
Language Precision (pr) Recall (r) F-Score( f s) #Vulns
C 0.625 0.5 0.556 13
Java 1.0 0.167 0.286 6
Table 5.5: Infer: Resulting metrics for resource leaks
It seems that Infer is less reliable (0.625) on identifying resource leaks than memory leaks on
C source code. However, the amount of studied vulnerabilities for resource leaks (13) was lower
than memory leaks (20). At the same time, its capability of correctly identifying vulnerabilities
resource leaks for C (0.5) is higher than in for memory leaks (0.368). The resulting F-score reflects
a tool with a medium performance on resource leaks identification (0.556) with is almost the same
as for memory leaks.
Since 0 FPs were caught for resource leaks in Java, the metrics reflect a precision of 1.0 but
at the same time they also reflect a recall of 0.167 which means a really bad sensibility on Java
resource leaks identification. Overall, the performance of Infer capability on detecting Java
resource leaks in bad (0.286). But as mentioned before the number of used vulnerabilities is low,
so this may not be a good reflection even though it reflects studies done before saying that SATs
are still far from their higher level of maturity.
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5.2.1.3 Overall
In general and now with a higher considerable amount of samples we can have a better look
on the perfomance of Infer on memory leaks and resource leaks identification.
Figure 5.11: Distribution of FP, TP and FN on detecting memory leaks (1) and resource leaks (2)
by Infer
It was possible to identify FPs for the two patterns and the sum of FP and FN percentages is
higher than the TPs percentage. There is a higher percentage of FPs and TPs on resource leaks
than in memory leaks (Fig. 5.11), i.e., resource leaks has a lower percentage of FNs.
Pattern Precision (pr) Recall (r) F-Score( f s) #Vulns
ml 0.7 0.292 0.412 27
rl 0.667 0.375 0.480 19
Table 5.6: Infer: Resulting metrics for memory leaks and resource leaks
Based on the metrics results, it is possible to conclude that the precision, recall and resulting
f-score from both patterns is pretty close, being resource leaks the pattern identified with more
success by Infer. However, due to the considerable difference of studied vulnerabilities between
both patterns, it may not be correct to make this conclusion since the final f-scores are very close.
Tool Precision (pr) Recall (r) F-Score( f s) #Vulns
Infer 0.684 0.325 0.441 46
Table 5.7: Resulting Infer metrics
Overall, Infer’s performance is medium on identifying resource leaks and memory leaks
with a f-score of 0.441 and worst sensibility (0.325) level compared with reliability (0.684).
5.2.2 SAT: Find-Sec-Bugs
Find-Sec-Bugs is a SAT for detecting Java security vulnerabilities. It identifies 113 dif-
ferent patterns which are more difficult to find than memory leaks and resource leaks. A higher
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percentage of the vulnerabilities in our database for Java or Scala are not covered by the patterns
due, mainly, to the type of libraries and APIs used by them. After a few research on Github Big
Query and Github search engine, searching for a few combinations of more specific words repre-
senting Find-Sec-Bugs patterns, it was conclude that based only on commits messages it won’t
be easy to find test cases to study this tool. Scala patterns will be very hard to find since Scala
it is not even one of the most popular languages on Github. Several patterns are indentified by
CWE but the outcome of the SecBench research is that developers don’t use much this kind of
identification. So, looking for CWE on messages won’t be a good approach.
The approach for this tool needs to be different. First, it may be a good ideia to do a collection
of Java web applications on Github in order to find test cases more easily. And then, the mining
tool may be adapted to scan the imports of each file involved on the Vdi f f sample and evaluate if
the libraries and APIs are present.
The results for this tool aim to show that we need to change things in our methodology to be
successful with tools that support patterns with higher specificity.
5.3 Conclusions
According to the perfomed empirical evaluation, we can conclude that:
• Github has security vulnerabilities for a wide range of different years.
• The top 5 of languages with more percentage of accepted vulnerabilities on our database
reflects the top 5 on Github.
• It is possible to find a good amount of identified vulnerabilities (CVE) with this approach.
• According to the correlations presented, repositories with higher size and development time
can be a better bet.
• Although, it is difficult to find viable test cases that reflect the models and whose complexity
is understood by the tools, we can find a considerable amount of vulnerabilities inside of
each test case.
• With the test cases hosted by our database (the result of 2-3 months of mining and evalua-
tion), we were able to find samples to successfully study a SAT using security vulnerabilities
mined from Github.
• Tools identifying security patterns with higher specificity need different approaches from
the one used until now.
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Chapter 6
SAT Problems
In this chapter, an overview of the results of a few test cases studied with Infer are provided
and discussed, in order to prove that the tool still needs modernization.
6.1 Infer
Infer is a static analysis tool used to identify memory leaks on Objective-C and C code; and,
resource leaks on Java and C code.
Resource leaks in C are reported when resources like files, sockets and connections are opened
and never closed. Resource leaks in Java include input streams, output streams, readers, writers,
sockets, http connections, cursors, and json parsers. Infer focuses mainly on exceptions skipping
past close() statements when scanning for resource leaks in Java.
Infer identifies memory leaks in C if variables are initialized with malloc, realloc and cal-
loc. Objective-C memory leaks are reported for objects created using Core Foundation or Core
Graphics (iOS) and not released.
It also identifies null dereference vulnerabilities but we were not able to study it due to the
lack of test cases.
6.2 Infer: How does it work?
For a given piece of code, Infer [CD11] synthesises pre and post specifications (represented
by Hoare’s triples) of the form below inferring suitable P and Q.
{P}C{Q}
Instead of expressing functional correctness, specifications express memory safety. Infer
uses bi-abductive inference to synthesise pre and post-conditions in specifications. Bi-abductive
inference consists in solving or validate:
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H ∗ A ` H ′ ∗ F
where H and H ′ are the separation logic formulaes describing a heap configuration and Frame
and Anti-frame which need to be inferred [CD11].
The tool automatically discovers only the specifications for the functions that do not leak
memory (memory safe).
Infer does a compositional shape analysis [CDOY11] using Bi-Abduction, which makes
possible the handling of procedure calls (interprocedural analysis).
6.3 Results and Source Code Comparison
Here, 7 different cases studied for Infer will be presented. We try to discuss why the tool did
not work based on the models and type of analysis performed. However, further research must be
done to get into the root of the problems, in order to understand how exactly we can improve the
tool. The main goal of the next points is to show that Infer still needs modernization and that
we can pinpoint it somehow.
6.3.1 Case 1
The first case presents 2 FPs for memory leaks caught by the tool. These results can be seen
in the second part of figure 6.1. Infer detected two memory leaks which do not exist since the
variable reachability is released/ownership is transfered to ARC1 on line 157.
This is not a vulnerability but we thought it would be interessant to the study since it is a real
false positive that we caught through the mining process.
From the report, Infer thinks that reachability is being allocated again through initWith-
Reachability after being allocated using SCNetworkReachabilityRef from Core Foundation. But
the ownership of the object is transferred to ARC, so it can release the memory allocated when the
object is not needed anymore.
Infer has the possibility of tracking all the analysis path which allowed to easily pinpoint
the problem. The tool does not recognize the function CFBridgingRelease (Fig. 6.2) because it is
not a method from the project (it is from Core Foundation) and it is not implemented on infer’s
models. Thus, when Infer tries to create the specifications of function initWithReachability it is
not successful and throws the memory leaks errors.
1https://developer.apple.com/library/content/releasenotes/ObjectiveC/
RN-TransitioningToARC/Introduction/Introduction.html
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Figure 6.1: Infer Case 1: 2 FP for memory leaks in Objective-C
Figure 6.2: Infer Case 1: Trace bugs
6.3.2 Case 2
The second case presents 2 FPs for resource leaks caught by the tool. These results can be
seen in the second part of figure 6.3. Infer detected two resource leaks which do not exist since
the variable fd is closed for the two different conditions on line 1481 e 1492.
This vulnerability was caught scanning the source code for memory leaks in on of the test
cases.
After analyzing the models for open and close on Infer repository, we were not able to
totally understand why Infer returned these results. A resource leak is launched if close model
returns −1 after open returns a result 0 or higher. The close model calculates an arbitrary non
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deterministic int value which is the return value of the function. The problem can be here but we
are not 100% sure.
Figure 6.3: Infer Case 2: 2 FP for resource leaks in C
6.3.3 Case 3
This case is a FN for resource leaks for C. If the condition on line 35 is true, the function
returns. Before the return, fd must be closed. Infer probably does not identify the vulnerability
because it has no model representing dup2, so it is not capable of understanding the condition
value. The condition is skipped because the tool is not able to make the comparisons.
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Figure 6.4: Infer Case 3: 1 FN for resource leaks on C
6.3.4 Case 4
This is a FN for resource leaks for C. In this case, if the creation, binding or the starting of a
socket fails, the function needs to return and the socket needs to be closed. It is almost the same
things as case 3. Infer only recognizes socket as a pattern. Thus, the tool is not able to make the
other comparisons to obtain the condition value and the resource leak is not identified.
Figure 6.5: Infer Case 4: 1 FN for resource leaks in C
6.4 Conclusions
These are a few examples of test cases we were able to study for Infer. The main objective
of this chapter is to expose the concerns the researchers need to have in order to understand how
the tool works. Since this kind of tools do not have much documentation, the only way of knowing
the models and the type of analysis made by the tool is studying the tools source code.
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Under this methodology, we were able to find points of modernization of the tool. Although,
not pointed yet, the majority of static analysis tools have really bad reports and lack of information.
It is general for all OSS tools.
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Conclusions and Future Work
As a result of this thesis, a database containing real security vulnerabilities is proposed. In
particular, SecBench is composed of 682 real security vulnerabilities, which was the outcome of
mining 248 projects - accounting to almost 2M commits - for 16 different vulnerability patterns.
The importance of this database is the potential to help researchers and practitioners alike
improve and evaluate software security testing techniques.
We have demonstrated that there is considerable information on open-source repositories to
create a database of real security vulnerability for different languages and patterns. And thus,
we can contribute to considerably reduce the lack of real security vulnerabilities databases. On
Github, besides several languages and patterns, we can also find a large variety of different devel-
opers with different programming skills. Thus, the test cases quality may not be the best, since we
do not have automated ways of checking que quality of a repository.
Overall, this methodology has proven itself as being very valuable since we collected a consid-
erable number of security vulnerabilities from a very small group of repositories (248 repositories
from 61M). However, there are several points of possible improvements, not only in the mining
tool but also in the evaluation and identification process which can be costly and time-consuming.
SATs can be studied using this methodology. Yet, the patterns identified by the tool can be
pretty specific which may not work with the approach of the mining tool now.
Finding test cases that match with the tools models, it is not easy and some samples can even
be so complex that we were almost sure that the tool would not identify anything.
A positive point is the fact that we were able to find more than one vulnerability for more than
80% of the studied test cases. Although, we were using a small group of test cases, we were able
to almost duplicate the amount of results.
We were also able to show that Infer needs to be modernized not only through the values
obtained on the empirical evaluation but also in the previous chapter where we try to pinpoint
a few problems. Thus, we were able to prove our initial hypothesis even though it needs to be
improved.
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7.1 Answer Research Questions
In order to prove our hypothesis, we tried to answer a few research questions focused on the
data and the results obtained under this methodology.
RQ1.1: s there enough information available on OSS repositories to create a benchmark of soft-
ware security vulnerabilities?
From 248 repositories (the equivalent to almost 2M of commits), we were sucessfully able to
collect 682 vulnerabilities for 16 different patterns.
15.4% of our database are identified vulnerabilities (CVE). We were able to obtain results from
the mining tool for more than 60% of the repositories where almost 50% contained real security
vulnerabilities.
In the end, we were able to extract vulnerabilities with an existence ratio of 2.75 per repository
which can lead to a potential database of 168 billions of test cases. Even if it does not lead to such
a high number, it is already satisfactory having an initial database of 682 vulnerabilities from
only 248 repositories and with such variety since only one database of real security vulnerabilities
existed until now (only for Python).
Due to the dimension of the domain under study (Github) and the number of mined repositories
we can give an answer to this question with only 99% of confidence and with a margin of error
equal to 8.18%.
There are enough vulnerabilities available on open-source repositories to create a database
of real security vulnerabilities.
RQ1.2: What are the most prevalent security patterns on OSS repositories?
After mining and evaluating the samples, we obtained results for 16 different patterns. Al-
though we are using a considerable amount of projects for these statistics, it is possible that the
most prevalent patterns change as we continue the study.
From mining 16 patterns, we can conlude that xss (20.67%), injec (14.81%) and ml (12.46%)
are the trendiest patterns on OSS which is curious since injec takes the first place on Top 10
OWASP 2017 and xss the second. ml does not integrate the top because it is not a vulnerability
normally found on web applications.
Although, misc has a higher percentage than ml we do not considerate it for the answer since
it contains several different patterns in smaller sizes.
The most prevalent security patterns are Injection, Cross-Site Scripting and Memory Leaks.
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RQ2.1: Is it viable to study SATs with real security vulnerabilities?
Using this methodology we were able to collect a few test cases to study the tool. However, it is
a difficult task since many of the samples would not match the tool models. In order to collect test
cases for patterns with higher levels of specificity, the mining tool must be improved. Checking
only the commits messages is not a good methodology.
More than 80% of the test cases contain more than one vulnerability which end up satisfying
the lack of test cases. Two different vulnerabilities were sucessfully studied (memory leaks and re-
source leaks), each of them for two different languages and an overall of three different languages
(Java, C and Objective-C).
Based on the results reported by the tool for each vulnerability, we were able to take conclu-
sions about the tool’s performance in terms of reliability and sensibility. In the end, we conclude
that Infer has a precision of 0.684, a recall of 0.325 and a final score of 0.441 which reflects a
medium performance tool.
It is viable to find samples on Github to study SATs but it also is important to have in mind
the tool’s patterns specificity.
RQ2.2: Can we understand where SATs can be improved using this methodology?
The tool study results allowed us to pinpoint a few problems in the tool. We are not still sure
of how to solve the issues but based on the models and the technology under the tool we were able
to somehow understand the problems.
Through the metrics results we were also able to understand if the tool is good or not. Despite
presenting just 4 cases of examples that represent problems on the SAT, we successfully identified
problems in the tool.
Yes, it is possible to pinpoint problems in a SAT using this methodology.
7.2 Limitations
Although the resulting number of vulnerabilities is considerable, it is also too much time-
consuming and the vulnerabilities evaluation are highly dependent on humans inserting a high
percentage of errors in the results.
The mining tool needs to be improved, in order to, overcome the limitations related with
retrieving samples for more specific patterns.
The sample under study may not be representative of all the Github domain and the number
of test cases used to study the tool may not reflect the real tool’s performance. Thus, the values
obtained in this study may not be considerable.
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7.3 Contributions
This thesis makes the following main contributions:
• SecBench, the first benchmark with a considerable amount of security vulnerabilities test
cases and, mainly, focused on the study of static analysis tools.
• Empirical study of Github with a few interesting outcomes that could indeed help future
researchers on improving the mining approach.
• Although still limited, a methodology which showed its value proving the thesis hypothesis.
• A good comparison between more than 25 static analysis tool that can help future re-
searchers to choose the next tool to be studied.
• A set of OSS tools and applications to mine, validate and manage data.
7.4 Future Work
There are many ways for improvement in this study and opportunities to future work:
• Extend the scope to more source code hosting websites (e.g., bitbucket, svn, etc).
• Augment the amount of security vulnerabilities, patterns and languages support.
• Augment the number of tools studied and, hopefully, provide information to help companies
choosing the most reliable tools.
• Evaluate if we can obtain information about security vulnerabilities from pull requests and
possibly classify repositories with a level of maturity based on the number of pull requests
related to the patch of vulnerabilities.
• We can use mutants to represent real security vulnerabilities under specific conditions to
increase the variety of test cases[JJI+14].
• Contribute with improvements for these tools based on our results.
• Use natural processing languages to improve the mining tool, in order to minimize the
garbage collected through the mining process.
7.5 Publications
The first version of Secbench was submitted and accepted on the 28th International Workshop
on Principles of Diagnosis (DX’17), 2017 for a poster session. The paper outlines the mining
process, data validation and the results obtained after mining 238 repositories for 16 different
patterns.
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Another paper is being prepared for submission to the Workshop on Secure Software Engi-
neering in DevOps and Agile Development authored by Sofia Reis and Rui Abreu. The paper is
an improvement to the one submitted at DX’17.
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Appendix A
Patterns
This appendix includes the visualization of the regular expressions created to extract the prim-
itve data from Github. We based our patterns, mainly, on the top 10 OWASP of 2017 (Sec. A.1).
Then, we added more patterns that are trendy out of web applications (Sec. A.2). For each pattern,
the words and combinations used to extract information are presented using regexper1.
1https://regexper.com/
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A.1 Top 10 OWASP 2017
The top 10 OWASP has 10 different types of patterns usually found on web applications:
• A1: Injection (Sec. A.1.1)
• A2: Broken Authentication and Session Management (Sec. A.1.2)
• A3: Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) (Sec. A.1.3)
• A4: Broken Access Control (Sec. A.1.4)
• A5: Security Misconfiguration (Sec. A.1.5)
• A6: Sensitive Data Exposure (Sec. A.1.6)
• A7: Insufficient Attack Protection (Sec. A.1.7)
• A8: Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) (Sec. A.1.8)
• A9: Using Components with Known Vulnerabilities (Sec. A.1.9)
• A10: Underprotected APIs (Sec. A.1.10)
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A.1.1 A1 - Injection
Figure A.1: Injection pattern
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A.1.2 A2 - Broken Authentication and Session Management
Figure A.2: Broken Authentication and Session Management pattern
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A.1.3 A3 - Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)
Figure A.3: Cross-Site Scripting pattern
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A.1.4 A4 - Broken Access Control
Figure A.4: Broken Access Control pattern
A.1.5 A5 - Security Misconfiguration
Figure A.5: Security Misconfiguration pattern
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A.1.6 A6 - Sensitive Data Exposure
Figure A.6: Sensitive Data Exposure pattern
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A.1.7 A7 - Insufficient Attack Protection
Figure A.7: Insufficient Attack Protection pattern
A.1.8 A8 - Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF)
Figure A.8: Cross-Site Request Forgery pattern
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A.1.9 A9 - Using Components with Known Vulnerabilities
Figure A.9: Using Components with Known Vulnerabilities pattern
A.1.10 A10 - Underprotected APIs
Figure A.10: Underprotected APIs pattern
A.2 Others
Other security patterns were created:
• Memory Leaks (Sec. A.2.1)
• Resource Leaks (Sec. A.2.2)
• Context Leaks (Sec. A.2.3)
• Path Traversal (Sec. A.2.4)
• Denial-of-Service (Sec. A.2.5)
• Overflow (Sec. A.2.6)
• Miscellaneous (Sec. A.2.7)
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A.2.1 Memory Leaks
Figure A.11: Memory Leaks pattern
A.2.2 Resource Leaks
Figure A.12: Resource Leaks pattern
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A.2.3 Context Leaks
Figure A.13: Context Leaks pattern
A.2.4 Path Traversal
Figure A.14: Path Traversal pattern
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A.2.5 Denial-of-Service
Figure A.15: Denial-of-Service pattern
A.2.6 Overflow
Figure A.16: Overflow pattern
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A.2.7 Miscellaneous
Figure A.17: Miscellaneous pattern
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Appendix B
Scientific Paper
This appendix presents a scientific paper written with the database results which was submitted
in a conference.
B.1 SECBENCH: A Database of Real Security Vulnerabilities
The first version of Secbench was submitted and accepted on the 28th International Workshop
on Principles of Diagnosis (DX’17), 2017 for a poster session. The paper outlines the mining
process, data validation and the results obtained after mining 238 repositories for 16 different
patterns.
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Abstract
Currently, to satisfy the high number of system
requirements, complex software is created which
turns its development cost-intensive and more
susceptible to security vulnerabilities. In software
security testing, empirical studies typically use ar-
tificial faulty programs because of the challenges
involved in the extraction or reproduction of real
security vulnerabilities. Thus, researchers tend to
use hand-seeded faults or mutations to overcome
these issues which might not be suitable for soft-
ware testing techniques since the two approaches
can create samples that inadvertently differ from
the real vulnerabilities. Secbench is a database of
security vulnerabilities mined from Github which
hosts millions of open-source projects carrying a
considerable number of security vulnerabilities.
We mined 238 projects - accounting to more than
1M commits - for 16 different vulnerability pat-
terns, yielding a Database with 602 real security
vulnerabilities.
1 Introduction
According to IBM’s X-Force Threat Intelligence 2017 Re-
port1, the number of vulnerabilities per year has been sig-
nificantly increasing over the past 6 years. IBM’s database
counts with more than 10K vulnerabilities only in 2016
mainly cross-site scripting and SQL injection vulnerabili-
ties which are also two of the main classes that incorporate
the 2017 Top-10 security risks created by the OpenWeb Ap-
plication Security Project (OSWAP)2.
The past years have been flooded by news from the cy-
ber security world: exposure of large amounts of sensitive
data (e.g., 17M of zomato accounts stolen in 2015 which
were put up for sale on a dark web marketplace only now in
2017), phishing attacks (e.g., Google Docs in 2017), denial-
of-service attacks like the one experienced last year by Twit-
ter, The Guardian, Netflix, CNN and many other compa-
nies around the world; or, the one that possibly stamped the
year, the ransomware attack which is still very fresh and
kept hostage many companies, industries and hospitals in-
formations. All of these attacks were able to succeed due to
1https://securityintelligence.com/media/ibm-x-force-threat-
intelligence-index-2017/
2https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Top_10_2017-Top_10
the presence of security vulnerabilities in the software that
were not tackled before someone exploit them.
Another interesting point reported by IBM is the large
number of undisclosed vulnerabilities, i.e., vulnerabilities
that do not belong to any known attack type or class which
can be harmful since developers have been struggling al-
ready with the disclosed ones.
Testing is one of the most important activities of software
development life-cycle since it is responsible for ensuring
software’s quality through the detection of the conditions
which may lead to software failures.
Most software development costs are spent in identifying
and correcting defects [1]. Several static analysis tools (e.g.,
infer, find-sec-bugs, symbolic pathfinder, WAP, brakeman,
dawnscanner and more) are able to detect security vulnera-
bilities through a source code scan which may help reducing
the time spent on that two activities. Unfortunately, their de-
tection capability is comparable or even worse than random
guessing [2], i.e., the percentage of undetected security vul-
nerabilities of these tools is high and the number of correctly
detected defects is lower than the false ones.
In order to study and improve these software testing tech-
niques, empirical studies using real security vulnerabilities
are crucial [3] to gain a better understanding of what tools
are able to detect [4].
Yet, performing empirical studies in software testing re-
search is challenging due to the lack of widely accepted and
easy-to-use databases of real bugs[5; 6] as well as the fact
that it requires human effort and CPU time [3]. Conse-
quently, researchers tend to use databases of hand-seeded
vulnerabilities which differ inadvertently from real vulnera-
bilities and thus might not work with the testing techniques
under evaluation [7; 8].
Although there are databases targeting security vulnera-
bilities test cases, only one of them contains real vulnerabil-
ities, the other ones are a mix of real and artificial or even
only artificial samples.
This paper reflects the results from mining 238 projects
from Github for 16 different patterns of security vulnera-
bilities and attacks which led to the creation of Secbench,
a database of real security vulnerabilities for several lan-
guages that is being used to study a few static analysis tools.
With this study, we aim to provide a methodology to
guide mining security vulnerabilities and provide database
to help studying and improving software testing techniques.
Our study answers the next questions:
• RQ1 Is there enough information available on open-
source repositories to create a database of software se-
curity vulnerabilities?
• RQ2 What are the most prevalent security patterns on
open-source repositories?
All the information related to Secbench is available
at https://tqrg.github.io/secbench/. Our
database will be publicly available with the vulnerable ver-
sion and the non-vulnerable version of each security vulner-
ability (i.e., the fix of the security vulnerabilities).
The paper is organized as follows: in section 2, we
present the existing related work; in section 3, we explain
how we extracted and isolated security vulnerabilities from
Github repositories; in section 4, we provide statistical in-
formation about Secbench; in section 5, we discuss results
and answer the research questions. And, finally, in section
6, we draw conclusions and discuss briefly the future work.
2 Related Work
This section mentions the existing related work in the field
of databases created to perform empirical studies in the soft-
ware testing research area.
The Software-artifact Infrastructure Repository (SIR) [6]
provides both real and artificial real bugs. SIR provides ar-
tifacts in Java, C/C++ and C# but most of them are hand-
seeded or generated using mutations. It is a repository
meant to support experimentation in the software testing do-
main.
The Center for Assured Software (CAS) created artifi-
cial test cases - Juliet Test Suites - to study static analysis
tools. These test suites are available through National Insti-
tute for Standards and Technology (NIST)3. The Java suite
has 25, 477 test cases for 112 different Common Weakness
Enumerations (CWEs) and the C/C++ suite has 61, 387 test
cases for 118 different CWEs. Each test case has a non-
flawed test which will not be caught by the tools and a
flawed test which should be detected by the tools.
CodeChecker4 is a database of defects which was cre-
ated by Ericsson with the goal of studying and improving
a static analysis tool to possibly test their own code in the
future.
The OWASP Benchmark5 is a free and open Java test
suite which was created to study the performance of auto-
mated vulnerability detection tools. It counts with more than
2500 test cases for 11 different CWEs.
Defects4j[5] is not only a database but also an exten-
sible framework for Java programs which provides real bugs
to enable studies in the software testing research area. They
started with a small database containing 375 bugs from 5
open source repositories. The researchers allow the devel-
opers to build their framework on top of the program’s ver-
sion control system which adds more bugs to their database.
Safety-db6 is a database of python security vulnera-
bilities collected from python dependencies. The developers
can use continuous integration to check for security vulner-
abilities in the dependencies of their projects. Data is be
analyzed by dependencies and their security vulnerabilities
or by Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE)7 de-
scriptions and URLS.
3https://samate.nist.gov/SRD/testsuite.php
4https://github.com/Ericsson/codechecker
5https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Benchmark#tab=Main
6https://github.com/pyupio/safety-db
7https://cve.mitre.org/
Secbench is a database of only real security vulnerabili-
ties for several different languages which will help software
testing researchers improving the tools capability of detect-
ing security issues. Instead of only mining the dependen-
cies of a project, we mine security vulnerabilities patterns
through all the commits of Github repositories. The test
cases - result of the patterns mining - go trough an evalua-
tion process which tells if it will integrate the final database
or not.
3 Extracting And Isolating Vulnerabilities
From Github Repositories
This section describes the methodology used to obtain the
real security vulnerabilities through the mining process.
Our main goal with this approach is the identification and
extraction of real security vulnerabilities fixed by develop-
ers. We started with the identification of several security
patterns (3.1) to use on our mining tool. To understand what
would be the most popular patterns on Github, we based
ourselves on Github searches and Top 10 OSWAP 2017.
Thereafter, we kept adding more patterns and we still have
place for many more. The patterns were used for mining
commits’ messages. Every time the tool caught a pattern, it
saved the sample on the cloud and the informations attached
(e.g., sha, url, type of security vulnerability) on the database.
As we can see on Fig.1, after saving the data there is an eval-
uation process (3.3) to validate whether the caught sample
is really the fix of a security vulnerability or not. If ap-
proved, the sample’s information is updated on the database
and, consequently, the test case (3.2) is added to the final
database.
3.1 Patterns - Extracting/Detecting
Vulnerabilities
Since we are mining for vulnerabilities that were fixed by
a developer we tried to collect a group of words that would
represent a fix, a protection or a patch, i.e., words that would
be used by a developer in the commit. For each pattern we
created a regular expression which joins specific words from
the class and words that possibly indicate that was a patch
of a vulnerability. First, we tried to create patterns for the
Top 10 OSWAP 2017 and then we extended the tool to oth-
ers that can be found in our website: https://tqrg.
github.io/secbench/patterns.html. Besides
words related to each pattern, we added to the miscellaneous
pattern the identification of dictionaries of common vulner-
abilities or weaknesses (CVE, NVD or CWE).
injec Injection
auth Broken Authentication and Session Management
xss Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)
bac Broken Access Control
smis Security Misconfiguration
sde Sensitive Data Exposure
iap Insufficient Attack Protection
csrf Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF)
ucwkv Using Components with Known Vulnerabilities
upapi Underprotected APIs
Table 1: Top 10 2017 OSWAP
Figure 1: Workflow to extract and identify real security vulnerabilities
ml Memory Leaks
over Overflow
rl Resource Leaks
dos Denial-of-Service
pathtrav Path Traversal
misc Miscellaneous
Table 2: Other Security Issues/Attacks
3.2 Samples/Test Cases Structure
Every time a pattern is found in a commit by the mining tool,
a test case is created. The test case has 3 folders: Vfix with
the non-vulnerable source code from the commit where the
pattern was caught (child), Vvul with the vulnerable source
code from the previous commit (parent) which we consider
the real vulnerability; and, Vdiff with two folders, added
and deleted, where the added lines to fix the vulnerability
and the deleted lines that represent the security vulnerability
are stored (see Fig. 2).
3.3 Requirements - Samples Evaluation
After obtaining the samples and their information, we
started the manual evaluation of the diff provided by Github
between two commits. For being accepted, each vulnerabil-
ity needs to fulfill a group of requirements:
• The vulnerability belongs to the class where it is be-
ing evaluated
If it does not belong to the class in evaluation the vul-
nerability its put on hold for later study except if the
class in evaluation is the Miscellaneous class which
was made to mine vulnerabilities that might not be-
long to the other patterns; or to catch vulnerabilities
that may skip in other patterns due to the limitations of
using regular expressions in these cases.
• The vulnerability is isolated
We accepted vulnerabilities which include the imple-
mentation of other features, refactoring or even fixing
of several security vulnerabilities. But the majority of
security vulnerabilities founded are identified by the
files names and lines where they are present. We as-
sume that Vfix is all necessary to fix the security vul-
nerability.
• The vulnerability needs to really exist
Each security vulnerability is evaluated to see if it is
a real vulnerability or not. During the analyze of sev-
eral samples we caught commits that were not related
with security vulnerabilities and fixes of vulnerabilities
which were not really fixes.
3.4 Requirements - Challenges
These requirements were all evaluated manually, hence a
threat to the validity as it can lead to human errors (e.g.,
bad evaluations of the security vulnerabilities and adding
replicated samples). However, we attempted to be really
meticulous during the evaluation and when we were not sure
about the security vulnerability nature we evaluated with a
D (Doubt) and with R (Replica) when we detected a repli-
cation of other commit (e.g., merges or the same commit in
other class). Sometimes it was hard to reassign the com-
mits due to the similarity between patterns (e.g., ucwkv and
upapi). Other challenge was the trash (i.e., commits that
did not represent vulnerabilities) that came with the mining
process due to the use of regular expressions.
4 Empirical Evaluation
In this section, we report the results that we obtained
through our study and answer the research questions.
4.1 Database of Real Security Vulnerabilities
This section provides several interesting statistics about
Secbench that were obtained during our study.
Our database contains 602 real security vulnerabilities,
mined from 238 projects - the equivalent to 1115427 com-
mits - covering 16 different vulnerability patterns (2,1).
85 out of the 602 security vulnerabilities were identified
by the authors using the CVE identification system. These
85 vulnerabilities belong to 79 different CVE classes (e.g.,
CVE-2013-0155 and CVE-2017-7620).
Secbench includes security vulnerabilities from 1999 un-
til now (2017), being 2012, 2013 and 2014 the years with
higher percentage of vulnerabilities.
Besides having a considerable number of real security
vulnerabilities, it also covers 13 different languages being
PHP (47.7%), C (15.4%), and Ruby (14.6%) the languages
with higher number of samples (see Figure 3). This supports
the higher percentage of security vulnerabilities caught for
injec (16.1%), xss (23.4%) and ml (12.8%) - Fig. 4 - since
Figure 2: Difference between Vfix, Vvul and Vdiff
C is a language where memory leaks are predominant and
Ruby and PHP are scripting languages where Injection and
Cross-Site Scripting are popular vulnerabilities.
4.2 Research Questions
As mentioned before, there are several automated tools that
can scan security vulnerabilities on source code. Yet, their
performance is still far from an acceptable level of maturity.
To find points of improvement it is necessary to study them
using real security vulnerabilities.
The primary data for this kind of studies is scarce as we
discussed on section 2, so we decided to first evaluate if
there is enough information on Github repositories to create
a database of real security vulnerabilities (RQ1). And if
yes, what are the security patterns we can most easily find
on open source repositories (RQ2).
- RQ1: Is there enough information available on
open-source repositories to create a database of
software security vulnerabilities?
To answer this question, it was necessary to analyze the
distribution of real security vulnerabilities across the 238
mined Github repositories (MRepositories). As a result
of our mining process for the 16 different patterns (Ta-
ble 3), 63.03% of the repositories contained vulnerabilities
(VRepositories) and 36.97% contained 0 vulnerabilities.
# of MVulns # of MRepositories % of MRepositories
> 0 150 63.03%
= 0 88 36.97%
Total 238 100%
Table 3: Mined Vulnerabilities Distribution
After mining the repositories, we performed our manual
evaluation where each candidate needs to satisfy a group of
requirements (3.3). Here, as we can see on Table 4, the per-
centage of success, i.e., vulnerable repositories, decreases
to 52.67%. The approximated difference of 10% is due
to the cleaning process made through our evaluation where
we try to understand if the actual code fixes and represents
a security vulnerability which, normally, resulted on false
positives, when the commits (Vvul and Vfix) did not repre-
sent the fix of security vulnerabilities; replications when the
Vdiff was already evaluated; or, doubts when we doubted
the presence of vulnerabilities in the Vdiff .
Although the decreasing from one process to another, we
can still obtain a considerable percentage (more than one
half) of VRepositories containing real vulnerabilities.
# of RVulns # of VRepositories % of VRepositories
> 0 79 52.67%
= 0 71 47.33%
Total 150 100%
Table 4: Accepted/Real Vulnerabilities Distribution
In the end, we were able to extract vulnerabilities with an
existence ratio of ⇡ 2.53 (602/238). The current number
of repositories on Github is 10M , so based on the previous
ratio we can possibly obtain a database of ⇡ 25 millions
(25294118) of real security vulnerabilities which is ⇡ 42
thousand (42017) times higher than the current database.
Accordingly, it is possible to extract a considerable amount
of vulnerabilities from open source software to create a
database of real security vulnerabilities that will highly con-
tribute for the software security testing research area.
There are enough vulnerabilities available on open-
source repositories to create a database of real secu-
rity vulnerabilities.
- RQ2: What are the most prevalent security
patterns on open-source repositories?
This research question attempts to identify the most preva-
lent security patterns on open-source repositories.
After mining and evaluating the samples, we obtained re-
sults for 16 different patterns. Although we are using a con-
siderable amount of projects for these statistics, it is possible
that the most prevalent patterns change as we continue the
study. Based on Fig. 5, we can conclude that xss (23.4%),
injec (16.1%) and ml (12.8%) are the trendiest patterns on
open-source projects which is curious since injec takes the
first place on Top 10 OSWAP 2017, xss the second and ml
does not even has a place on the top.
Memory leaks exist because developers do not manage
memory allocations and deallocations correctly. These kind
Figure 3: Distribution of real security vulnerabilities per language
Figure 4: Distribution of real security vulnerabilities per year
Figure 5: Distribution of real security vulnerabilities per pattern
of issues are one of the main reasons for dos attacks and reg-
ularly appeared in our manual evaluations even in the misc
class.
Injection and Cross-Site Scripting are prevalent on soft-
ware and easy vulnerabilities to catch since the exploits are
similar and exist, mainly, due to the lack of data sanitization
which oftentimes is forgotten by the developers. The only
difference between the two is the side from where the ex-
ploit is done (server or client). Although these three patterns
are easy to fix, the protection against them is also typically
forgotten.
After these patterns, misc is the most prevalent which is
normal since it takes vulnerabilities that still do not have
a pattern defined or vulnerabilities whose place is not well
defined yet.
Although auth is taking the second place on Top 10 OS-
WAP 2017, it was not easy to to find samples that resemble
this pattern. The csrf and dos patterns are seen frequently
among Github repositories: adding protection through un-
predictable tokens and fixing several issues which lead to
denial-of-service attacks.
The most critical patterns to extract are definitely bac,
which detects unproved access to sensitive data without en-
forcements; upapi, which detects the addition of mecha-
nisms to handle and answer to automated attacks; and,rl that
normally involve also memory leaks but here we are only
considering communication, files, etc.
The other patterns (e.g., smis, sde, iap, ucwkv, over and
pathtrav) are pretty common during our evaluation process
and also on our Github searches.
Other interesting point here is the considerable percent-
age of iap, which normally is the addition of methods to
detect attacks. This is the first time that iap makes part of
the top 10 OSWAP 2017 and still we were able to detect
more vulnerabilities for that pattern than for bac which was
already present in 2003 and 2004.
The most prevalent security patterns are Injection,
Cross-Site Scripting and Memory Leaks.
5 Conclusions & Future Work
This paper proposes a database, coined Secbench, contain-
ing real security vulnerabilities. In particular, Secbench is
composed of 602 real security vulnerabilities, which was
the outcome of mining 238 projects - accounting to more
than 1M commits - for 16 different vulnerability patterns.
The importance of this database is the potential to help re-
searchers and practitioners alike improve and evaluate soft-
ware security testing techniques.
We have demonstrated that there is enough information
on open-source repositories to create a database of real secu-
rity vulnerability for different languages and patterns. And
thus, we can contribute to considerably reduce the lack of
real security vulnerabilities databases.
This methodology has proven itself as being very valu-
able since we collected a considerable number of secu-
rity vulnerabilities from a small group of repositories (⇡
0.024% of the total number of Github repositories). How-
ever, there are several points of possible improvements, not
only in the mining tool but also in the evaluation and identi-
fication process which can be costly and time-consuming.
As future work, we plan to augment the amount of se-
curity vulnerabilities, patterns and languages support. We
will continue studying and collecting patterns from Github
repositories and possibly extend the study to other source
code hosting websites (e.g., bitbucket, svn, etc).
Acknowledgments
This work is financed by ERDF – European Regional
Development Fund through the Operational Programme
for Competitiveness and Internationalization - COMPETE
2020 Programme within project POCI-01-0145-FEDER-
006961, and by National Funds through FCT – Foun-
dation for Science and Technology as part of project
UID/EEA/50014/2013. Luis Cruz is sponsored by an FCT
scholarship grant number PD/BD/52237/2013.
Furthermore, we would like to thank Luis Cruz for his
valuable feedback on earlier versions of this paper.
References
[1] Gregory Tassey. The economic impacts of inadequate
infrastructure for software testing. Technical report, Na-
tional Institute of Standards and Technology, May 2002.
[2] Katerina Goseva-Popstojanova and Andrei Perhinschi.
On the capability of static code analysis to detect secu-
rity vulnerabilities. Inf. Softw. Technol., 68(C):18–33,
December 2015.
[3] L. C. Briand. A critical analysis of empirical research
in software testing. In First International Symposium
on Empirical Software Engineering and Measurement
(ESEM 2007), pages 1–8, Sept 2007.
[4] Lionel Briand and Yvan Labiche. Empirical studies
of software testing techniques: Challenges, practical
strategies, and future research. SIGSOFT Softw. Eng.
Notes, 29(5):1–3, September 2004.
[5] René Just, Darioush Jalali, and Michael D. Ernst. De-
fects4j: A database of existing faults to enable con-
trolled testing studies for java programs. In Proceedings
of the 2014 International Symposium on Software Test-
ing and Analysis, ISSTA 2014, pages 437–440, New
York, NY, USA, 2014. ACM.
[6] Hyunsook Do, Sebastian Elbaum, and Gregg Rother-
mel. Supporting controlled experimentation with test-
ing techniques: An infrastructure and its potential im-
pact. Empirical Softw. Engg., 10(4):405–435, October
2005.
[7] René Just, Darioush Jalali, Laura Inozemtseva,
Michael D. Ernst, Reid Holmes, and Gordon Fraser. Are
mutants a valid substitute for real faults in software test-
ing? In Proceedings of the 22Nd ACM SIGSOFT In-
ternational Symposium on Foundations of Software En-
gineering, FSE 2014, pages 654–665, New York, NY,
USA, 2014. ACM.
[8] Spencer Pearson, José Campos, René Just, Gordon
Fraser, Rui Abreu, Michael D. Ernst, Deric Pang, and
Benjamin Keller. Evaluating and improving fault local-
ization. In ICSE 2017, Proceedings of the 39th Inter-
national Conference on Software Engineering, Buenos
Aires, Argentina, May 2017.
